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INTRODUCTION 
As an instniment of government, the Articles of Confederation 
was one of the most advanced of its time. With great care it separ­
ated local powers from those of general character. It provided dual 
authority; the states were sovereign in their sphere and the Congress 
sovereign in its national realm. Article II provided that "Each State 
retains its sovereignty, freedom, and Independence, and every Power, 
jurisdiction and right, which is not by this confederation expressly 
delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled."^ These powers 
expressly delegated to the national sphere were: the exclusive power 
of determining peace and war; sending and receiving ambassadors, enter­
ing into treaties and alliances; establishing courts of equity and 
admiralty (Congress itself was the last court of appeals for disputes 
between states or citizens); regulating the currency; establishing post 
offices; appointing all officers of land and sea forces; and determin­
ing the requisitions of each state for paying off the national debt 
through a common treasury. The Confederation provided freedom of 
movement for its citizens, and national citizenship. Under the Arti­
cles of Confederation each individual held the same freedoms as another. 
Article IV states unequivocably, "... and the people of each state 
shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other state, and 
^Winton U. Solberg (ed.), "The Articles of Confederation," The 
Federal Convention ̂ d the Formation of the Unioxi (Indianapolis: The 
Bobbs-Merrill Comply-, p. k2. 
1 
2 
shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject 
to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants 
2 
thereof respectively." In print it was a national government setting 
up a national treasury, national citizenship, and a national debt. 
Article XII provided that "all bills of credit emitted, monies borrowed 
and debts contracted by, or under the authority of congress, before the 
assembling of the united states, in pursuance of the present confedera­
tion, shall be deemed and considered as a charge against the imited 
states, for pajmient and satisfaction whereof the said united states, 
and the public faith are hereby solemnly pledged."-^ It cannot be 
doubted that in these instances the Articles of Confederation was a 
national government. 
The provision for regulating voting has been considered one of 
the flaws of the Confederation. Article V declared that delegates were 
to be annually elected, "in such a manner as the legislature of each 
state shall direct." They were also subject to recall any time the 
state demanded, and the delegates could be replaced by others. By 
mathematical deduction it is easy to conclude that each state would 
soon run out of competent delegates to fill the annual requirement. 
But the stipulation that "no person shall be capable of being a dele­
gate for more than three years in any term of six yearsallowed a 
delegate to be re-elected if he was considered competent. It is also 
worthy to note that in the state debates over the Constitution, the 
Antifederalists feared the number of years a senator was allowed to 
hold office. Such a long temi in office would change the Senate into 
2lbid.. p. ii3. hbid., p. 50. ^Ibid., p. k3' 
3 
"a rich man's club," more concerned with the rich than with the poor. 
Meanwhile, the Continental Congress only lacked delegates because the 
states often did not send any at all—even before they had exhausted 
their supply. Secondly, those most competent to govern returned again 
and again to fulfill the duties a deferent society placed in their 
keeping. 
Another flaw was in the stipulation that each state had only one 
vote and a majority of states—nine—must agree before legislation 
could become law. Moreover, all thirteen states had to agree on an 
amendment before it could be effective. These "flaws" shall later be 
taken up in detail. Here it is only necessary to mention them as po­
tential defects in an instrument that in theory was efficient. Article 
XIII solidified the Confederation by declaring that "Every state shall 
abide by the dsterminations of the united states in congress assembled, 
on all questions which by this Confederation are submitted to them."^ 
The Articles of Confederation provided for a unified, comprehensive, 
well-balanced government. Because the delegates of the Continental 
Congress strictly limited their power, these "flaws"became a subject of 
criticism for historians» Had the powers of the Confederation been 
broadly interpreted these "flaws" would never have become paramount nor 
even visible to the critical eye of contemporary historians blessed 
only with the insipid faculty of hindsight. 
Almost from the beginning the Articles of Confederation met with 
dissatisfaction from critics. To name the more prominent, James Madison, 
Alexander Hamilton and George Washington found the Articles defective. 
^Ibid., p. 51. 
u 
After the Federal Convention, the exaltation of the Constitution became 
the fetish and the Articles of Confederation was consigned to the rub­
bish pile. Historians took up the theme which the Founding Fathers had 
set to harp music. William Henry Prescott, in his Diplomatic History 
of the Administrations of Washington and Adams, published in 1857> found 
the time between the peace of I783 and the adoption of the Constitution 
in 1788 "the most critical period of the country's history." John 
Fiske, in The Critical Period of American History, 1783-1789, took up 
Prescott's theme and farther hammered at the Articles' defects. Andrew 
McLaughlin, although finding the Articles of Confederation in some 
aspects honorable, in The Confederation and the Constitution, could not 
condone its impotence,^ 
Charles A. Beard, in M Economic Interpretation of the Constitu­
tion, upset the myth of the Constitution's infallibility. Writing as 
a Progressive historian. Beard's original intention was to prove the 
Constitution less democratic and more autocratic than what the people 
believed. Beard distinguished, in his Economic Interpretation of the 
Constitution, between two leading types of propertied interest—land 
and commerceo Commercial property was strongly represented in the Con­
stitutional Convention; landed property was represented by those opposed 
to the Constitution. Despite intense opposition in certain states, the 
Constitution was ratified, but this ratification was not a true repre­
sentation of the people. He based this argument on the prevalence of 
property qualifications for suffrage, which meant that only a minority 
%ichard B. Morris, "The Confederation and the Constitution," 
William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, XIII (April, 1956), 139-156. 
of freeholders and other owners of property could participate in elec­
tions to the ratifying conventions. As a consequence the ratifying 
conventions were not truly representative. In short, there was a clash 
between the mercantile and landed interests, with the mercantile inter­
ests coming out on top because of the power conferred by their economic 
advantages. The Founding Fathers were, mainly, man of the aristocracy, 
or men holding commercial property. The Constitution was founded for 
7 
the protection of this "elite". The great, uncanny hallowness of the 
Constitution was shattered. Historians took up Beard's interpretation 
and rewrote and reiterated it AD NAUSEAM. 
Merrill Jensen also tried to discredit the Constitution. He 
argued that the Federalist party was organized to destroy the kind of 
democratic government made possible by the Articles of Confederation. 
The Articles of Confederation mirrored the true expression of democracy 
and the ideals set forth in the Declaration of Independence. The Con­
stitution was a betrayal of these principles. The Articles of Confed­
eration was designed to prevent the central government from infringing 
upon the rights of the states, whereas the Constitution was designed to 
check both the states, and the democracy that found expression within 
O 
state boundaries. Examining the Confederation period, Jensen found 
that "the history of the period too often is written in terras of the 
shrill cries of politicians who were seldom easy when in office and who 
"^Charles A^ Beard, ̂  Economic Interpretation of the Constitution 
of the United States (New York? Macmillan Company, 1913)• 
^Merrill Jensen, The Articles of Confederations An Interpretation 
of the Social-Constitutional History of the American Revolution, IYTU-
1781 (Madison; University of Wisconsin Press, 19l|.8)o 
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prophesied doom when their opponents won elections."^ In this period 
there was not gloomy pessimism but an " exaberant optimism" everywhere. 
Instead of being a "critical period" in American history, the Confeder­
ation was a constructive period during which the national debt was 
reduced, commerce began to prosper, and manufactures were encouraged.^® 
Forrest McDonald, Robert Brown and Lee Benson headed the van­
guard of reaction against Beard. The most devastating attack was 
McDonald's. Examining the actual tax records of the states, McDonald 
found that Beard had never studied the economic holdings of all ratify­
ing conventions. No voting patterns by the states were found to conform 
to Beard's thesis of personalty—there was no split in the ratifying 
conventions between those who owned property and those of the commercial 
interests,^^ Robert Brown attacked Beard's methodology. He fourd that 
Beard had examined the economic holdings in I780 and 1790 and not 
during the ratifying convention itself. Beard further distorted the 
picture by confining himself to the big states' fights and not probing 
into the motivations of small states. Brown concluded by asserting 
12 
that the whole colonial society was democratic and not aristocratic. 
Lee Benson re-interpreted Beard's book. Both Beard and his critics 
had failed to understand the difference between an "economic interpre­
tation".and "economic determinism". What Beard had actually done in 
Q 
Merrill Jensen, The New Nation; A History of the United States 
During the Confederation, 1781-1789 (New York; Knopf, 19^0), p. 87. 
^Qlbid. 
^Forrest McDonald, We the People; The Economic Origins of the 
Constitution (Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1958). 
l^Robert Eldon Brown, Charles Beard and the Constitutions A 
Critical Analysis of. "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution" 
JPrinceton: University of Princeton Press, 1956). 
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his study was to utilize economic determinism, but since such a method 
had not yet been distinguished as a special method of analysis. Beard 
did not identify it as such. Brown and McDonald both erred when they 
undertook to disprove Beard by using an economic interpretation. Benson 
took Beard's economic determinism and applied it to a social interpreta­
tion. Through his social interpretation he re-affirmed Beard's economic 
statement—'the crux of the conflict lay in the social clash between the 
commercial and agrarian elements of society.^3 
The reaction against Beard and Jensen brought a renewed assertion 
of the Constitution's value and the Confederation's defects. However, 
the reaction against Beard never quite swung back to the post-Federal 
Convention adulation. J, Ro Pole, in his article "Historians and the 
Problems of Early American Democracy,expressed the important idea 
that institutions should not be viewed through modern concepts of demo­
cracy. The concept of democracy in the twentieth century cannot be 
applied to the eighteenth century. "The idea that the great mass of 
the common people might actually have given their consent to the con­
cepts of government that limited their participation in ways completely 
at variance with the principles of modern democracy" adumbrate contem­
porary judgments. Furthermore, the colonial and the early national 
periods were pervaded "by a belief in and a sense of propriety of social 
order guided and strengthened by the principles of dignity on the one 
1^ 
hand and deference on the other. It was ... a deferential society." 
^^Lee Benson, Turner and Beards American Historical Writing 
Reconsidered (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, I960). 
Ro Pole, "Historians and the Problems of Early American 
Democracy," American Historical Review, LXVII (1962), 6k^. 
^^Ibid., p. 6kS. 
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To argue which government was more democratic—the Constitution or the 
Confederation-—is irrelevant. Pole suggests an even more important 
points in examining an instrument of government, its "defects" must be 
considered in the light of the concepts of the time. The attitude of 
the people toward government, and the competence of those who were 
selected to govern, must be evaluated apropos the instrument of govern­
ment. 
This thesis explains the failure of the Articles of Confederation 
by examining the actions of those who governed, and the motivations of 
those who refused to be governed. The overriding focus is placed on the 
people and not the instrument of government. It is the contention of 
this thesis that any instrument of government must be judged, not on a 
mechanical basis, but with an eye on the men who operated that instil­
ment and the mass of people who were affected by the policies of those 
men, A great many of the failures of the Articles resulted from the 
narrow vision of the Continental delegates, and the strict construction 
by which they limited the government created for the needs—no matter 
what those needs may be-—of the people. All government, after all, 
requires men to mold it into what it shall become. If the delegates 
had been more confident of government, perhaps the government would 
have proved itself steadfast. If the people had found their delegates 
strong, perhaps they would have respected government. Confidence breeds 
confidence, and, conversely, fear breeds fear. A government influences 
all those under it. Disrespect cannot remain isolated in such cases. 
What begins at the top percolates downward until the entire nation is 
touched. The delegates' timidity affected the government; the govern­
ment affected the people. 
9 
Had the delegates broadly interpreted the Articles of Confedera­
tion many of the "flaws" would be non-existent. As will later be shown, 
there were attempts to interpret broadly the Articles of Confederation, 
but these attempts failed. The "flaw" of Article IX, that no congres­
sional resolution could become law "unless nine states assent to the 
same," was seen by the broad constructionalists as meaning a majority 
of nine, which would be five states. Had Article IX been interpreted 
thus many congressional resolutions that failed would have become law. 
A case in point was the five per cent impost which failed because only 
eight states approved the measure. Very often, then, the question of 
the efficiency of the Articles of Confederation rests upon how narrowly 
the delegates construed these clauses. 
In the early period of the Revolution the Continental Congress 
held the respect of the people. But as the Revolution lengthened into 
years and the timidity and ineptitude of the congressional body became 
more manifest, this respect dissolved into a general contempt. By 178? 
the manifestations of this were shown in the general anarchy of the 
times. People openly disregarded the mandates of Congress, and self-
interest completely overcame any altruistic feelings the people might 
have felt in the embryonic stages of national government. 
It will be shown in this thesis that many of the criticisms 
modem historians have levelled against the Articles of Confederation 
were not due to faulty government. The troubles that arose out of the 
Confederation period were due in large part to the attitude held by all 
people toward government; the inept and timid delegates who governed 
only with reluctance. Secondly, many of the mechanical difficulties. 
-10-
such as the unprepared state of the country for a large war, the prob­
lems of finance, and the inexperience of a country just recently separ­
ated from the British colonial empire, were elements that no government 
—-newly instituted—could have met. 
CHAPTER I 
A BRIEF SURVEY OF HUMAN NATURE 
This chapter tries merely to demonstrate, by a few choice exam­
ples, the Introduction's assertions. The writer has selected specific, 
and prominent, examples of men—from Congress, the military, and business 
—to further emphasize a point. Selfishness, pride and greed often were 
prevalent in the body politic and in the military. The concern for 
their own private interests far over-shadowed any national interest they 
held. 
Those who governed were all too often more concerned with their 
own dignity than with the dignity of the nation. A case in point is 
Thomas Burke of North Carolina. One fine evening Burke left the Congress 
in a huff and a messenger was sent to retrieve him. Burke replied, 
rudely, "Devil take me if I will come; it is too late and too unreason­
able." As befitted a body representing the national sovereignty, the 
intractable member the next day was called up before Congress and 
charged with breach of order. When asked if he could defend his con­
duct, Burke replied in the affirmative. He admitted that he had "in a 
manner" invoked the name of the Devil in his reply to the messenger, 
but insisted that he was guilty of no rudeness to Congress, for Congress 
was then adjourned. When Congress adjourned it "ceased to be a body." 
He declined, therefore, to make any apology. "What power has Congress 
over its members anyway? If he had been guilty of misbehavior, he would 
11 
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answer to his own state.Congress merely proved that it could not 
control its own members, and one member at least showed that he was 
quite capable of reducing dignity to a travesty. 
Personal honor instead of national honor very often was the con­
cern of military officers. Major-General John Sullivan was subjected 
to criticism of his ability in the Continental Congress. Critical 
remarks were not taken gracefully by Major-General Sullivan. In fact, 
in the correspondence of John Sullivan a large portion of his letters 
concern his egocentric preoccupation with these "smears" on his honor. 
George Washington was impelled finally to write a letter pleading with 
him to disregard such disparaging remarks, many of which were imaginary. 
Do not, my dear General Sullivan, torment yourself any longer 
with imaginary slights and involve others in the perplexities 
you feel on that score. No other officer of rank in the whole 
army has so often conceived himself neglected, slighted, and ill 
treated as you have done, and none I am sure has had less cause 
than yourself to entertain such ideas. Mere accidents, things 
which have occurred in the common course of service, have been 
considered by you as designed affronts.2 
The Deane-Lee controversy that began in Europe succeeded in find­
ing its way into the august halls of Congress. This controversy managed 
to disrupt and divide Congress while it lasted. Silas Deane had been 
sent to Hirope on official United States business. While there he man­
aged to involve himself in several shady business deals. Robert Morris 
and his nephew, Thomas Morris, were also involved. Deane had made an 
implacable enemy of Arthur Lee, the third commissioner at Paris. Arthur 
^Edmund Cody Burnett, The Continental Congress (New York: Mac-
millan Company, 19l4.l)> p. 298. 
^Otis G. Hammond (ed.). Letters and Papers of Major-General John 
Sullivan (3 vols.; Concord: New Hampshire Historical Society, 1939), 
II, 3.687 
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Lee and his brother, William Lee, were determined to expose the corrup­
tion in the American agency at Nantes, where Thomas Morris was in charge 
of operations. Morris kept all his papers relating to his commercial 
agency in a strong box. Upon his death, William Lee confiscated these 
papers. Benjamin Franklin had befriended Silas Deane and was involved 
to a certain extent in Deane's business dealings. When charged, Deane 
and Franklin defended their actions as vigorously as the Lees attacked 
them. The rupture among the American commissioners was soon complete. 
Everyone connected with the government service in Europe was forced to 
take sides. "Nourished by factionalism, the squabble in Europe assumed 
the dimensions of a major political trial which divided Congress into 
hostile camps and precipitated a struggle for control. Charges and 
countercharges crossed the Atlantic, reinforcing lines of division 
already existing."^ The Lees were on the side of the "Adams-Lee junto" 
which had long opposed Robert Morris, John Dickinson, and the Living­
stons. "To the proud and influential Lee family, the ascendance of 
Robert Morris and Benjamin Franklin marked a drift of power into un­
friendly hands.He promptly requested a hearing, but feeling ran so 
high that Congress could not decide to proceed with his examination. 
He was kept waiting for months while his accusers held the floor. Fin­
ally he published his side of the case in a Philadelphia newspaper, and 
the whole controversy spilled into print. The Deane affair continued 
to plague Congress until August, 1779- Congress was able to discover 
^E. James Ferguson, The Power of the Purse (Chapel Hill: Univer­
sity of North Carolina Press, 1961), p. 9it. 
^Ibid., p. 95. 
1h 
several business irregularities, bat not imich could actually be proved. 
Under such circumstances all that Congress could do was to refuse to 
grant Deane's claim for commissions and give him leave to depart. 
The Deane affair had unsavory aspects, and its results were 
destmctive. It laid bare to public view the selfish bickering 
that disgraced American service abroad; at one point a commit­
tee of Congress listed the offenses of which each of the foreign 
commissioners had been accused and suggested that all of them 
be recalled. Neither Arthur Lee nor anyone else gained credit 
for his part in it. At home, the controversy excited the deep­
est animosities without resulting in any important administra­
tive reforms or constructive alterations in the balance of power 
in Congress. The rancor it left was for years the underlying 
basis of Congressional division on questions which might better 
have been considered on their own merits.5 
While a majority of Americans sympathized with the "patriotic 
cause," only a small minority were actively interested and ready to 
sacrifice their material comfort for an ideal. A large number were 
staunch loyalists. Added to this number were those who were overly 
fond of the good things of life and not anxious about the success of 
either the patriots or the loyalists. They sold their produce for Brit­
ish money, while the American array starved. After the sWolution these 
groups—minus those loyalists who had fled the country—welded themselves 
into a general body of selfish inertia. Attempting to tax such a body 
proved frustrating. As Robert Morris pointed out to Benjamin Franklin; 
"The people are undoubtedly able to pay, but they have easily persuaded 
themselves into a conviction of their own inability, and in a govern­
ment like ours the belief creates the thing.The people were not 
destitute. There is abundant evidence to show that at the end of the 
^Ibid., p. IOI4.. 
^Andrew Cunningham McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Consti­
tution (New York; Haiper & Brothers, 1905), p. 69. 
15 
Revolution people were living with more ease and circumstance than before 
the war. If nothing else, Merrill Jensen, in The New Nation. shows that 
7 
prosperity was evident, if not organized. The trouble was not poverty 
but commercial confusion, and a native disinclination to pay taxes. 
Charles Thompson of Virginia described the scenes 
The population is increasing, new houses building, new lands 
clearing, new settlements forming, and new manufactures estab­
lishing with a rapidity beyond conception, and what is more, 
the people are well clad, well fed, and well housed. Yet I 
will not say that they are contented. The merchants are com­
plaining that trade is dull, the farmers that wheat and other 
produce are falling, the landlords that rent is lowering, the 
speculists and extravagant that they are compelled to pay their 
debts, and the idle and the vain that they cannot live at others' 
cost and gratify their pride with articles of luxury,° 
The American Revolution was the incubator of the defects com­
plained about in the Confederation, and they were in turn the product of 
popular reactions and political cowardice. In the early days of the 
In examining the Confederation period, Merrill Jensen finds that 
although the "New Nation" was predominantly agrarian, the farmers de­
pended upon the shippers to export their produce to Europe and the West 
Indies. The farmers' prosperity was linked to the prosperity of the 
merchants and shippers. The merchants and shippers that exported and 
bought these products in turn found prosperity in depreciating currency 
since prices rose as a consequence. "They bought goods and held them 
while prices went up." After the Revolution westward expansion and 
the growth of cities were added evidence of prosperity. "War itself 
was partly responsible for the new growth. Merchants from smaller 
towns moved into larger ones and rapidly took the place of Loyalist 
merchants who had left." The newly won independence also produced 
growth in manufacturing, banking, and new markets for exportation. 
There might have been restrictions on trade by various national gov­
ernments, but "... only one conclusion can be drawn regarding the 
paths of commerce in the eighteenth centurys governments marked them 
out by law but provided only the weakest means of enforcement. Mer­
chants and shipoTmers followed the paths if they seemed profitable; 
if not laws be damned. There is nothing in the knowable facts to 
support the ancient myth of idle ships, stagnant commerce, and bank­
rupt merchants in the new nation." Jensen, The New Nation, pp. 177-233. 
"MacLaughlin, The Confederation and the Constitution, p. 78. 
16 
Confederation the prestige of the Continental Congress was high. But 
from the outset the members of Congress failed to utilize that prestige 
to set up a government that worked efficiently, and with authority. 
Why, then, should the people have confidence in a government afraid of 
its own shadow? Ineptitude and timidity breed only contempt, not re­
spect. For a government to act on its own tenets it must have delegates 
who have faith in those tenets. By the end of the Revolution the people 
had found the Continental Congress wanting in all the characteristics 
that instill respect. The Confederation fell, not through the weakness 
of its structure, but through the weakness of those men who were to 
uphold that structure. 
The Revolutionary War was undertaken without adequate preparation, 
and handicapped by a general shortage of funds. The national government 
of the Confederation has been found contemptible in the eyes of contem­
poraries. The states ignored its requisitional demands, and it was 
incapable of enforcing these demands. It has somehow been overlooked, 
however, that the states were as poor as the national government. Most 
often the states were incapable of meeting the requisitional demands. 
Instead of ignoring Congress, they were as impotent as Congress in try­
ing to meet the expenses of a major war without the financial basis to 
do so. 
CHAPTER II 
BETTER "IN THE RED" THAN DEAD 
A chief criticism of the Articles of Confederation concerns its 
lack of coercive powers.^ As a consequence of this defect taxation 
proved difficult, if not impossible. The states rarely produced their 
full quotas on requisitions. The problem, however, did not result or 
even start with the Confederation. An early source of irritation between 
the colonies and the mother country concerned paper currency. The use 
of paper money was a solution to the problem created by a shortage of 
coin and the absence of banking institutions. As E. James Ferguson 
points out, all hard money brought in by commerce flowed outward in the 
purchase of British commodities. 
An undeveloped country, America could not produce enough to 
buy goods needed for its economic development; more was always 
imported than American cargoes of tobacco, wheat, furs, and 
naval supplies could procure; hence an unfavorable balance of 
trade with Britain,^ 
^The lack of coercive powers was a constant complaint among 
politicians of the time. George Washington incessantly lamented the 
inability of Congress to enforce its resolutions. James Madison, 
Alexainder Hamilton, Robert Morris, John Sullivan—to name the more 
prominent—found congressional impotencB a matter of continual concern. 
The Founding Fathers, quick to justify the newly instituted Constitu­
tion, pointed to the coercive powers of the new government as a means 
of greater efficiency. Historians, such as John Fiske, William Henry 
Prascott, George Bancroft, and Andrew MacLaughlin, found the Confeder­
ation inadequate and the Constitution a decided improvement. Their 
justification for this position inevitably brought out the Confedera­
tion's impotence in the face of state opposition. "No power to enforce, 
merely to request" constantly was the argument used to demonstrate the 
Constitution's merits and the Confederation's great flaw. To the 
Founding Fathers and the early historians of the period, such impo­
tence was the cause for all the evils of mismanagement and disobedience. 
2 
Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 1;. 
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The flow of hard money was toward Britain rather than America. Hard 
money in America was more of a "commodity" than a medium of exchange. 
There were no banks to enlarge the money supply by employing the avail­
able specie to back a paper medium. During the colonial era, the legis­
latures of each colony printed paper money as needed to meet war expend­
itures. The legislative acts which authorized these emissions almost 
always assigned specific taxes for their redemption. If import duties 
produced about five thousand pounds a year, the income for four years 
ahead was allocated to redeem twenty thousand in bills of credit.^ 
Taxes for years ahead were appropriated to withdraw money emitted in a 
single year. Begun in war, currency finance was then adapted to the 
ordinary functions of government in time of peace. In short, a basic 
financial pattern emerges out of the colonial eras governments met ex­
penses by issuing a paper medium directly to the people; they then 
redeemed this paper—not by exchanging it with hard money—but by ac­
cepting paper money for taxes or other payments. 
That paper money had a tendency to be unstable did not bother 
the colonists. The sole test of currency was not its constancy of value. 
Another criterion is suggested by Thomas Pownall, a New England merchant, 
"it was never yet objected that depreciation injured them in trade. 
One of the greatest merchants in America, Thomas Hancock, was not con­
vinced that paper money was an unmitigated evil. When Massachusetts 
passed an act, putting it on a sound money basis, Hancock complained, 
"This d—d Act has turn'd all Trade out of doors and it's impossible 
to get debts in, either in Dollars or Province Bills." To an expanding 
^Ibid., p. 10. ^Ibid., p. 1^. ^Ibid. 
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country whose people seldom had fixed incomes "it is possible that a 
constant and continuing inflation was not entirely injurious." During 
the Revolution Americans, were merely pursuing a tradition "with no 
thought of unorthodoxy or innovationo" In colonial times their govern­
ments had used "fiat" money; in fact, their "whole system of public 
finance was based on it."^ 
The unfavorable balance of trade between the colonies and Great 
Britain did not improve with independence. To a great extent, it wor­
sened. With the Navigation Acts, the colonists had enjoyed lucrative 
trade under the auspices of the British Crown; with independence this 
disappeared. Merrill Jensen makes the apt observation that while the 
American merchants did not like the bonds of the Empire when a part of 
it, "they had enjoyaci its privileges and after the war was over many 
7 
did not think they could survive without them." 
The worsening condition of trade during the Revolution was a 
matter of concern to Richard Henry Lee. In 1776 he expressed his anxi­
ety to Patrick Henry. 
The War cannot long be prosecuted without Trade, nor can 
Taxes be paid until we are enabled to sell our produce, which 
cannot be the case without help of foreign ships, whilst our 
enemy's navy is so superior to ours. A contraband sloop or so 
may come from foreign parts, but no authorized, and conse­
quently sufficiently extensive Trade will be carried on with 
us whilst we remain in our present undefined tinmeaning condi­
tion, o 
Trade was further hampered by the confiscation of ships for war purposes. 
6lbid. 
"^Jensen, The New Nation, p. iSh-
p 
°James Curtis Ballagh (ed.), The Letters of Richard Henry Lee 
(2 vols.; New York: Macmillan Company, 191U), I, 179. 
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Thomas Thompson of Massachusetts wrote an irate letter to the Massachu­
setts Committee of Safety complaining about the confiscation proceedings 
against the ship Raleigho 
All Privateers are stopped for the purpose of manning the 
Continental Ships of War and filling up the army. The State of 
Massachusetts Bay strictly keep to their first intention, inso­
much that the same owners concerned in the Privateer now in 
Portsmouth were obligated to bring two of their ships up from 
the Castle, which had been victualled and manned some time and 
ready for sea: they have petitioned and remonstrated to the 
Council several times since urging the Damage and great expense 
they have been at, but to no effect: they only received for 
answer, the public good must be preferred to the private inter­
est. 9 
Under normal conditions the money problem of the Confederation 
would not have achieved such enormous proportions, but the Confederation 
was forced to fight a war with very little specie. The issuance of 
paper money was the only way to finance the war. Since any scheme to 
support widespread military operations with thirteen state currencies 
would have created insuperable difficulties, Congress adopted a Contin­
ental currency. Congress pledged the faith of thirteen states to its 
redemption. Each state was made responsible for the withdrawal of a 
certain quota of the total emission. Paper emissions required some 
sort of balance between issuing and- withdrawing, but Congress had little 
power to control either. Because Congress could not control the expend­
itures of war, nor effect the withdrawals of paper money, Continental 
currency depreciated beyond control. But Congress continued to print 
money until its value was almost gone, convinced that the only alterna­
tive was to abandon the war. As the President of Congress put it, the 
^Nathaniel Bouton (ed.), Documents and Records Relating to the 
State of New Hampshire Daring the Period of the American Revolution, 
from 1776-1783 (10 vols.; Concord: Edward A. Jenks, Printer, I87I4), VIII, 
U83. 
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Congress was convinced that "any quantity of brown paper would serve the 
purpose. 
If the Continental Congress found the states falling behind on 
their requisitions it was often because the states did not have the money 
either. The states could levy taxes, but, as Benjamin Franklin observed, 
they had not in the early years of the war "the Consistency for collect-
11 
ing heavy taxes." State governments were new-born and sometimes 
wracked by internal disorder. Their legality was not firmly entrenched, 
and they were more concerned with gaining popular support than with 
levying rigorous taxes. Such rigorous taxation would also dangerously 
suggest an onerous comparison with the enemy. Secondly, state govern­
ments suffered from the general war. Normal incomes from import and 
export duties were cut off, and it was hardly possible to lay taxes on 
property when men were leaving their occupations to join the arrr^r. 
Therefore, the states did not levy any taxes of significance in 1775 
12 
and 1776. As Gouvemeur Morris declared, it would have been "madness." 
By the time state governments were firmly entrenched and politi­
cally able to collect taxes, all paper money—Continental as well as 
state currency—had "gone into decline." Before taxes could be col­
lected, the income expected from them was eroded by depreciation. State 
governments could function only by issuing more quantities of paper 
money, and with each new emission th^ realized less and less income. 
"Unable to avoid spending every dollar they could lay their hands on, 
they put Continental money back into circulation as fast as it came 
^^Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 27. 
^^Ibid., p. 30. ^^Ibld.. p. 31. 
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into their treasuries.The obvious lack of money is evidenced in the 
correspondence of the time. In a letter to James Madison, Edmund Pen­
dleton of Virginia wrote, 
. . . the Executive, having an empty Treasury have circulated 
a TequBst f?3r a prompt advance of half the land tax payable 
some months hence for the purpose of recruiting our line. Our 
country . . . appear to be willing to comply, but from convers­
ing on the Subject with several gentlemen it is the general 
opinion, that there is not in the country Specie sufficient to 
pay one-fourth of that tax and I see no prospect of our being 
able to pay it at the time.^^ 
David Jameson of Virginia wrote to Madison, 
There is but little Specie in the State—not any in the 
Tresury—and those whose services are required by the state, 
will not take certificates, so that the meanest Goblar can now 
obtain Credit where the state cannot. How humiliating! While 
the tax payable in Tobacco continued in force, the state had 
some Credit, but that being set aside we are now quite bankrupt. 
I write this only to yourself.^5 
The State Treasurer of Virginia, Jacquelin Ambler, was forced to write 
a letter to James Madison explaining why Virginia was unable to pay 
Madison's expenses at Philadelphia. In exasperation he concluded the 
letter, "It is in vain for the Assembly to pass resolution after reso­
lution directing the Executive to make remittances, unless they will 
put Means in their hands also."^^ 
The necessity for taxation was emphatically stated by Major-
Qeneral John Sullivan. According to General Sullivan the prosperity 
of the United States depended on resolutions of the assemblies "to 
^^Ibid. 
^William Hutchinson and William Rachel (eds.). The Papers of 
James Madison, 1782 (5 vols.,* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
IV, 18U. 
^^Ibid.. p. 176. ^^Ibid., p. 18^. 
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proceed to tax the people, as deep as they can bare"; the only hurdle 
to be overcome was convincing the people of "this Sacred Truth, that it 
is in their Interest to pay high Taxes.But, as Richard Henry Lee 
pointed out in a letter to John Adams, taxation was not the cure-all 
for the chronic money problems. ". . .1 fear that the slow operation 
of Taxes, which indeed are pretty considerably pushed in many States, 
will not be adequate to the large emissions of paper money which the war 
compels us to msike."^® 
When it was found that the states could not meet requisitions by 
paying money, in 1780 Congress adopted a general requisition asking 
delivery of specific commodities such as beef, pork, flour and tobacco. 
But during the jrear or two in which this kind of requisition operated, 
it proved to be no more than a stopgap arrangement. Without money for 
purchasing, the states had to collect or seize the supplies from their 
citizens. Seizures of produce had to depend on the seasons, and deliv­
eries to Congress were spasmodic rather than constant. Frequently goods 
were not ready in time and the quantity needed for the array could not 
be obtained. The condition of the country was summed up well by Robert 
Morriss "A Revolution, dissolution of government, creating of it anew, 
cruelty, rapine, and devastation in the midst of our very bowels. These, 
19 
Sir, are circumstances by no means favorable to finance." 
The disorder of finances is clearly portrayed in a New Hampshire 
letter to the Continental Congress in 1782. The Continental Congress 
^"^Hammond, Letters of Ma.1or-General Sullivan, I, 366. 
X8 
Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, II, ij,06. 
^^Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 25-
2h 
had passed a resolution in March, 1780, requesting each state to call 
in all the Continental currency. Part of the money was collected, but 
it was generally thought that "at the time which said Tax was granted 
there was not half the Sum which was called for then in possession of 
the Inhabitants of this State." The state then passed an act for rais­
ing the sum of 120,000 pounds for the support of the War and for defray­
ing the charges of the state. The people were allowed to pay the tax 
in new bills or in Continental currency. The Continental currency was 
allowed for payment since it was unanimously assumed that "the whole 
quantity of Continental Currency then in this State would not amount to 
near the proportion assigned them by the Resolution of Congress." But 
New Hampshire had also asstimed that this resolution of Congress would 
be complied with by all states. The tax of 120,000 pounds was payable 
at different periods, and while the tax was being collected Continraital 
currency "depreciated rapidly" in the states to the South. Large quan­
tities of depreciated currency were pushed into New Hampshire and the 
Treasury found itself with five million dollars over and above the pro­
portion assigned it, "by which means the principal Intention of the 
State in granting said Tax of 120,000 pounds was in a great measure 
defeated, many debts which were determined to be discharged by said 
Tax are now unpaid . . . and the State will be unable to pay any con-
20 
siderable Sum to the United States." An initially simple solution 
resolved itself into a complicated dilemma. After such "historical 
facts" one can well understand Milton's meaning when he said, "Ify way 
of joking is to tell the truth." 
^^Bouton, Documents and Records of New Hampshire. X, 579. 
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The Act that Gongress instituted in March, 1780, was an attempt 
to issue new currency by revaluing the old currency. Under this plan 
Congress revalued the old Continental money at forty to one of specie. 
The states were called upon to tax this money out of existence at a 
rate of $1^,000,000 per month. Their deliveries of the old currency to 
Congress would release the new emission for use. Forty dollars of the 
old money, brought in, would release two dollars of the new money, of 
which four-tenths would go to Congress and six-tenths to the state de-
21 
livering the old. 
The problem New Hampshire faced with an excess of old Continental 
bills was largely due to the Congressional use of certificates. Certif­
icates were drafts which federal officers drew upon their respective 
departments. They were issued by all departments in place of money, but 
the (^artermaster and Commissary departments used them in overwhelming 
numbers. Certificates were issued to inhabitants of all states when the 
Continental army agents confiscated their produce. The massive certif­
icate debt which resulted foredoomed Congress's efforts to restore its 
currency. Loaded down with Quartermaster and Commissary notes, the 
people refused to pay the state taxes levied for Continental purposes 
unless certificates were accepted. It was politically impossible for 
the states to refuse to accept certificates for any taxes, especially 
since militaiy impressments were still putting them into the hands of 
their people. Since state taxes returned certificates, the bulk of 
outstanding Continental currency remained untouched. Even with the 
best of intentions, the states found it extremely difficult to comply 
21 
Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 33. 
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with the procedure set forth in the plan of March, I78O. The states 
could not realize the expected income from the emission of the new bills 
22 
since they could not withdraw the old currency. 
Money conditions in New Hampshire reached such a condition of 
paucity that, in one instance at least, the state could not send a dele­
gate to Congress. The Continental Congress was constantly in need of 
enough delegates to compose a forum to cariy on business. This was 
another short-coming of the Confederation, but in this particular in­
stance New Hampshire simply could not gather enough funds to send a 
delegate. As the New Hampshire Governor explained to the President of 
Congress, "It has not been in our Power to famish him with a sufficiency 
of hard money and none other will answer." The people were left "desti-
ture of any Medium" and the scarcity was such that nothing "will produce 
it" and "we have not been able to supply the Treasury with any Specie 
to answer any Demands. 
In fact, the financial condition of the country was such that 
John Hancock, President of the Continental Congress, could use "the 
unprepared state of the Colonies on the commencement of the War . . . 
and the almost total want of everything necessary to carry it on" as an 
argument against the accusation that Revolution had been the original 
intent of the colonists. "Had such a scheme been formed, the most war­
like Preparations would have been necessary to effect it."^^ This 
obviously was not a well-planned, well-equipped Revolution on this side 
^^Ibid.. p. 51. 
^^Bouton, Documents and Records of New Hampshire. X, ̂ 75. 
^^Ibid.. VIII, 122. 
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of the Atlantic, Major-General Sullivan complained constantly to the 
Board of War about the lack of supplies for the arTtQr. In reply the 
Board of War explained that the staff department had almost insuperable 
difficulties in their way, "among these may be reckoned the want of men 
and proper materials; of the former the country is much drained; and of 
the latter the old stocks are generally worked up or used, and no pro-
25 
vision made for future wants." 
The tremendous problems of depreciation both on the state and 
national level reached the realms of absurdity. For example, in 1779 
the cost of six pounds of snuff reached the height of $72; a pound of 
tea cost $35; two and a half pounds of tobacco cost $8.33; a pistol 
cost $115 (all new recruits for the Continental army and state militias 
had to supply their own weapons—which might in part explain their lack 
26 
of enthusiasm for volunteering). However, Irving Brant makes the 
startling suggestion that printing money was in itself a form of taxa­
tion. Question; How could Congress tax dollars that weren't worth a 
Continental? Answer: Currency inflation is taxation upside down. The 
paper currency Congress emitted was in itself a tax, "a tax of terrific 
weight, bearing directly on the people." As the value depreciated be­
yond hope of redemption it had the effect of "a capitol levy upon credi­
tors, virtually wiping out the value of promissory notes and mortgages." 
The implication is clear—the leaders knew, even if the people did not, 
that during the Revolution when they appeared to be conducting a war 
25 
-^Hammond, Letters and Papers of Ma.jor-General Sullivan, II, 79. 
^^Simeon E. Baldwin, "The New Haven Convention of 1788," Papers 
of the New Haven Colony Historical Society (New Havenj Printed for the 
Society, 1882),?. 61. 
against taxation, Congress was actually taxing more heavily "by means of 
27 
the printing press than Parliament had done in all history." Analyz­
ing the years of 1775 to 1779, Robert Livingston, Secrertary of Foreign 
Affairs, declared that through the depreciation of continental bills of 
credit "the states that received them paid a tax equal to all the ex­
penditures of the army and a very considerable one beyond it . . . and 
28 
this tax too was most unjust and partial than can be conceived." 
Colonial practice became Revolutionary policy. In wars past, 
all colonial governments utilized fiat money as the only way of meeting 
the expenses. The Revolution was a much larger entearprise, and the 
common need precluded any nice regard for a stable currency. The colon­
ists had no hard coin, nor banking institutions which could provide a 
stable currency. If depreciation was an evil of the Revolution it was 
an evil that resulted from necessity. The Continental Congress and the 
thirteen states were both in a sinking ship with only paper money to 
throw overboard. If requisitions were a failure it was largely due to 
the poverty of the country. The states were unable to meet the finan­
cial demands of a major war. For example, from December, 1779, to June, 
1780, Congressional drafts amounted to approximately $U0,000,00G. And 
it must here be noted that the states made unusual efforts to discharge 
the drafts. They accepted and eventually paid $3^,000,000 and in later 
months discharged nearly $2,000,000 more. Under the stress of poverty. 
Congress in I78O attempted to delegate further responsibility to the 
states by turning over the burden of paying the army, both the arrears 
^"^Irving Brant, The Life of James Madison (6 vols.; Indianapolis; 
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 191^1), II, 323. 
^^Ibid., p. 32U. 
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of salary and the pay due for the current service.If the states 
failed it was not from a lack of effort. A request is no different 
than a demand when neither method can produce what is not there. Even 
had Congress used coercive powers, the financial history of the Revo­
lution would have been no different. 
^^Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 52. 
CHAPTER III 
DEDICATED TO THE IDEAL OF INTEREST, NOT PRINCIPLE 
Aside from money headaches there was the problem of governing a 
people who were suspicious of statecraft. It must be remembered that 
the Articles of Confederation took two years to draw up and three years 
to ratify. It established a government which would rale with carefully 
limited powers. It was weak because the delegates reflected the atti­
tudes of constituents who wanted weak government. The reaction against 
the British experience produced a government of strict construction— 
not from oversight—but from a conscious fear of strength. Citizens 
and delegates alike watched warily the functioning of government, and 
any sign of power was greeted with accusations of tyranny. Suspicious 
of government, citizens were also far too concerned with their own self-
interest. Self-interest opposed to national interest created problems 
in counterfeiting, illicit trade and even in recruiting soldiers for the 
array. 
By 1782 illicit trade had become so widespread that Congress fin­
ally produced a resolution against it. Before going into the resolution, 
it is well to note here the Congressional style of writing. It is char­
acteristic of the timid to couch their language in melodramatic phrases; 
to accuse by distortion—thereby hopefully achieving the same effect 
that a simple command would produce. Congress in most of its resolu­
tions took on the form of a timid fgither direfully portraying the con­
sequences of the son's transgressions instead of striking at the seat 
30 
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of the matter, thus ending further dissent. In melodramatic phrases 
did Congress couch resolutions. Illicit trade was portrayed as the 
enemy's arch weapon. The enemy was "resorting to every expedient which 
may tend to corrupt patriotism ... or to weaken the foundation of 
public credit" and in pursuance of such policy the British encouraged 
illicit trade between the colonists and those who lived within the 
places in British possession. Those in the American camp who frater­
nized thus lAth the eneriQr were indeed the traitors who were "prompted 
either by a sordid attachment to gain or by a secret conspiracy with 
the Enemies of their country." As a consequence, "payment of taxes is 
rendered more difficult and burdensome to the people at large, and 
great discouragement occasioned to honest and lawful commerce."^ Con­
gress, after direfully portraying the results of this nefarious trade, 
handed the entire sticky mess over to George Washington. He was given 
full authority to do whatever he thought proper to end such trade. 
Congress was very explicit in describing the evils, but very vagae in 
authorizing a plan of action. 
"A Plain FaiTner," in the New Jersey Gazette, declared that dar­
ing the past "few weeks" no less than forty to fifty thousand pounds in 
specie, otherwise available for payment in taxes, was drained out of New 
2 
Jersey by "moonlight peddlars." The Virginia delegates wrote to Gov­
ernor Harrison that "illicit trade with New York under the encouragement 
of the enemy, and the obstruction of foreign trade has increased of late 
3 
so far as to threaten great injury to the public finances." Edmund 
^Hutchinson and Rachel, Papers of Madison, IV, 3^2. 
^Ibid., p. 35U. 3ibid.. p. 36i|. 
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Randolph of Virginia found that illicit trade was exciting general in­
dignation in New York and threatened the loss of hard money. "The 
continued drain which it makes from the bank must at least contract 
its utility, if it produces no greater mischief to it."^ Although the 
legislature of New Jersey and a Committee of Congress were devising a 
remedy for this "disgraceful and destructive traffic," Randolph held 
little hope that any adequate cure could be applied, "whilst our fore^-gn 
trade is annihilated and the enemy in New York make it an object to 
keep open this illicit channel."^ 
Public officials did not separate their private affairs from 
the business of government. "Merchants viewed it as no breach of pro­
priety if, as public officials, they were linked in a dozen secret 
6 
partnerships with persons who sold goods to the government." The 
Secretary of Finance, Robert Morris, is an excellent example of this 
business ethic. E. James Ferguson finds that Morris and his partner, 
John Bingham, found "money, ships, and cargoes" for their own enter­
prises but were "apparently" unable to do as much when their private 
business was not involved. Bingham was sent to Martinique to handle 
West Indian trade. There was a problem in raising money to put the 
firm into operation. Morris wrote to Bingham that a "certain" cargo 
would be sent on private rather than public trade, "as we want to throw 
Funds into your hands." As Ferguson comments wryly, "When a choice 
could be exercised, it would appear that personal concerns sometimes 
7 
got priority over those of government."' 
^Ibid.. p. 3^0. ^Ibid. 
^Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 7ii. 
"^Ibid., p. 80. 
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The Deane-Lee controversy that ended on the floor of Congress 
began its sordid histoiy in Europe. Silas Dean was first sent to Europe 
as an agent for the Secret Committee, an office for procuring goods for 
the United States. His mission was to obtain loans in France and buy 
military supplies for Congress. While sent on official business, Deane 
found time to profit personally. "The Indian Contract," which Robert 
Morris and five other members of the Secret Committee concocted, stipu­
lated that Deane was to buy goods to the amount of $200,000—on credit 
if possible—while the other partners used committee money to buy and 
ship American products to pay the debts Deane contracted in Europe. 
Deane was next appointed to the post of Political Commissioner 
at the French Court. His new post involved dispatching Frfflich loans to 
the United States. Privy to the sailing schedules of ships, Deane knew 
when government cargoes were not completely full and shipped private 
goods. Within limits he could delay or hasten Continental warships to 
provide convoys for ships with private goods aboard. He and other Con­
tinental agents also had liberal freedom to dispose of booty taken by 
American privateers and ships of war. But Deane's greatest indiscre­
tion concerned the refitting of a ship in which the United States held 
a half-interest, and private companies the rest. The ship's captures 
did not pay the expense of its refitting and Deane turned over the pub­
lic 's share to the private interests without requesting payment or an 
estimate of the ship's v41ue. A ship bought and equipped largely at 
American expense fell into private hands. It would seem that private 
and public interests were shuttled back and forth according to the pros­
pects of profit. Criticism was also aroused by these secretive maneuvers 
3li 
because the cruise seriously compromised French neutrality and brought 
g 
protests from the French Court. 
As early as 1777 states were beginning to complain about the 
problems of counterfeiting. The effects on the paper currency issued 
by the states were disastrous. Counterfeiting was difficult if not 
impossible to trace to its source. A petition was sent to Congress 
from the Assembly of New Hampshire asking for aid, since counterfeiters 
had successfully demoralized the state. 
Very lately certain wicked and designing men, no ways regard­
ing the Welfare and Happiness of the said State, but from Base 
and sordid Motives have Fabricated and Uttered within the said 
State, great numbers of Counterfeit Bills in imitation of the 
paper bills Emitted as Aforesaid, by Reason whereof trade and 
intercourse are nearly at an end to the very great Damage of the 
said State." 
Richard Henry Lee, in 1778, wrote to Patrick Henry about the chaos in 
state emissions from counterfeiting. 
Already the Continental emissions exceed in a sevenfold pro­
portion the sum necessary for medium; the State emissions added, 
greatly increase the evil. It would be well if this were all, 
but the forgeries of our currency are still more mischievous. 
They depreciate not only by increasing the quantity, but by 
creating universal diffidence concerning the whole paper fabric. 
In my opinion these Miscreants who forge our money are as much 
more criminal than most offenders, as parricide exceeds murder. 
Reciniiting soldiers was a duty delegated to the states. That the 
states had trouble raising the number Congress and General Washington 
requested is witnessed by the method of enlistment New Hampshire devised. 
Finding herself destitute of new recruits owing to Massachusetts' entic­
ing offer of forty pounds bounty. New Hampshire, fighting principle with 
^Ibid., pp. 86-90. 
O 
Bouton, Documents of New Hampshire^ VIII, 598. 
^^Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, I, U^O. 
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interest, offered a larger bounty. Complaint then followed from states 
bordering on New Hampshire, for their ranks were suddenly depleted—the 
line forming on the right side of the New Hampshire border. As New 
Hampshire explained to the rankled Governor of Connecticut, "Nothing, 
but being reduced to the alternative of giving a larger bounty than was 
advised by the Committee at Providence or not raising the men propor­
tioned, would ever have induced this State to depart from their recom-
11 
mefflidation." Meschech Weare of New Hampshire replied to General 
Sullivan's entreaties that soldiers were scarce because of this battle 
of the bounties. 
Much pains have been taken to compleat the Quota of this 
State Allotted for the defence of the State you are in; but 
unforeseen embarrassments have been thrown in the way, chiefly 
tgr tha Meighboring State ojf Ife.ssachusetts, iffho have within a 
few weeks . . . hired 500 Ttien in this State at the Enormous 
rate of 100 pounds and 12? private bounty per man for nine 
months, and taken away a considerable nxunber that was engaged 
to Serve under you.^2 
New York could not gain enough men for their quota through other 
reasons. Their particular trials were related in a letter from the New 
York Council of Safety to the Committee of Safety of New Hampshire. 
Five counties of the state were in possession of the British, and three 
others were "disunited by malcontents who mediate a Itevolt and are at­
tempting to avail themselves of the present troubles to advance their 
interested Purposes." Of the remaining six counties, "a third part" of 
three of them—Orange, Ulster and Dutchess—"has been in actual service 
ever since May last and are yet in the field"; Westchester had been so 
harrassed by the "incursions of the Enemy from New York" that its militia 
llBouton, Documents of New Hampshire, VIII, ii97. 
^%ammond. Letters of John Sullivan. Ill, 61. 
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was forced to provide for its own defence. Add to this the number of 
inhabitants "constantly employed on the Ctomraunications, in transporta­
tion, etc.; and the still greater number who, tempted by prospects of 
ease and profits have quitted this invaded State and sought inglorious 
quiet among our more peaceful neighbors; and you Sir, will perceive how 
13 
greatly our strength is exhausted." ^ In short. New York was unable to 
provide its quota for the army, and New Hampshire was on her own in 
raiding enough to satisfy General Sullivan. 
Governor Trumbull of Connecticut complained to Meschech Weare 
that "the Supineness and languor that seems to take place and pervade 
every order and degree of men through our State" must be of great con-
cem to everyone who observed it, "and if continued much longer will 
without the special interposition of Heaven be followed with the most 
unhappy consequences." Instead of fighting in the field, the Continen­
tal Officers were "wasting their time in ineffectual efforts to gain 
Recruits in the Country." Governor Trumbull admitted that his state 
was as guilty as the rest, "tho' we are now using our utmost efforts to 
compleat our Battalions and send them into the Field, by detaching our 
Militia to fill up vacancies where they do not procure a sufficient 
1 ) 
number to Inlist voluntarily." States were having difficulty finding 
fighting men. The solution, according to Richard Henry Lee, was to 
utilize the suggestion of Congress. 
I really believe that the numbers of our lazy, worthless 
young Men, will not be induced to come forth into the service 
of their Country unless the States adopt the mode recommended 
^^Bouton, Documents of New Hampshire, VIII, 614.8. 
^^Ibid., p. Ii90. 
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by Congress of ordering Drafts from the Militia. This may 
induce the young and lazy to take the Continental Bounty, 
rather than serve for nothing of that sort.15 
Analyzing the temper of the people at that time, Irving Brant 
maintains that in "the early period of high continental power" impress­
ment was formally authorized by Congress. At this time Congress was 
more ready to utilize power than was General Washington. The failure 
of impressment was not due to "Constitutional qualms," but to the lack 
of power to make such an order effective. The array alone could make 
seizures, and it could do so only within the range of foraging expedi­
tions. Outside this range the states had to take up the call for arms, 
"but in Virginia, where the state had the military forces capable of 
making impressments and where the governor and cotincil hated profiteers, 
the state shared the powerlessness of Congress. Public opinion at this 
time was too hostile, or too lethargic, for state action." Federal 
impotence was not caused by "the theoretical division of authority, nor 
was impotence confined to one government." In short. Congress and the 
states "ran into two angles of the same rock—the unwillingness of the 
people to sacrifice private gain for the public good. 
The people found it more profitable to sell their produce to 
British troops. The enemy had solid coin, and the United States a flood 
of depreciated bills. Many states found it necessary to pass laws re­
stricting the sale of cattle and sheep. New Hampshire found the sup­
plies for the army so scarce that they issued a law in which each town 
was to have a "selectman" examine all sheep and cattle passing through 
^^Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, I, 286. 
l^Brant, Life of James Madison, II, 36h. 
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their tovn. If the sheep or cattle were found to be contraband, and 
not destined for the digestion of Continental soldiers, th^ were to be 
confiscated and sold "by said examinants at private sale for the most 
they will fetch to ar^ person and the money arising by such sale . . . 
shall be paid into the hands of the receiver-general of this State for 
17 
the use of the same." Richard Henry Lee described the smuggling 
trade in Virginia to Governor Thomas Johnson of Maryland: 
Passing thro' this Country on ray way from Congress, I find 
it the common talk here, that many avaricious, inconsiderate, 
and ill-designing people, have practiced largely the carrying 
live stock and other provisions to the enemies ships of war, 
now in the Potomac River opposite Boyds Hole. In particular, 
I am told of many boats loaded with provisions going to these 
ships from your shore ... It appears to me of much conse­
quence to the common casisA, as well as to the reputation of 
our respective government's, that this pernicious trai'fic 
should be prevented in the future. 
When the states prohibited exportation of provisions from their 
territories another problem then arose; the high prices charged for 
these goods by their own citizens. Caesar Rodney explained the dilemma, 
". . . Prices have not only increased very rapidly but there is a gen­
eral Indifference almost amounting to Disinclination to sell even those 
Commodities most necessary for the army."^^ To John Dickinson, Caesar 
Rodney spoke of the proliferation of speculators—in this instance, 
flour speculators. Writing to Dickinson for instructions on what method 
he was to use in procuring flour, Rodney warned that the price of flour 
might prove exorbitant. "You may Assure them I shall do everything in 
17 
Bouton, Documents of New Hampshire, VIII, 696. 
^®Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee. I, 369-370. 
^%eorge Herbert I^den, Letters to and from Caesar Rodney. 17^6-
1781; (Philadelphia; University of "Pennsylvania Press, 1933), p. 327. 
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my power to forward the business, but expect the flower will come high, 
as those termed Speculators are as thick and as industrious as Bees, 
PO 
and as active and wicked as the Devil himself." 
A great deal of the Confederation's troubles came not from the 
government, but from the governed. Viewing the turmoil from a distance 
one is tempted to rest the case on Mark Twain's explanation; "The evils 
of life are the eternal cruelties, hypocrities, and stupidities of man­
kind which have nothing to do with time or place but result from our 
Heavenly Father's haste in experimenting when he grew dissatisfied with 
the monkey." 
^Qlbid., p. 299. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE TIMID DARE NOT 
The impotence of the Confederation was also caused by the inepti­
tude of the delegates. The delegates' refusal to utilize any of the 
Congressional powers and their excessive loyalty to state welfare 
greatly decreased the prestige of the Congress. The Congressional 
"slump" of 1779 was explained by a contemporary of the time as the 
result of public disaffection with the Congressional delegates. "The 
public believes that the states are badly represented, and that great, 
and important concerns of the nation are horribly conducted, for want 
either of abilities or application in the members, or through discord 
and party views of some individuals."^ Caesar Rodney wrote of this 
disaffection to Henry Laurens, then President of Congress; "I am sorry 
to say, the suspicicas Congress entertains of the disaffection of the 
people is too well founded, but as the people at large are generally 
2 
directed by those at the Helm, Hope they will soon mend." 
Many delegates became disgusted with their fellow members. John 
Sullivan wrote to George Washington, 
Plans of finance and all other matters go on so slowly that 
I tremble at the consequence. I am mortified at the useless 
harangues which consume our time to no purpose. I fully agree 
with your excellency that Congress ought to have more power but 
I also think the old members should be in heaven or at home 
before this takes place.^ 
^Brant, Life of James Madison, II, 3k^-
Ryden, Letters to and from Caesar Rodney, p. 263. 
^Hammond, Letters of John Sullivan, II, 293. 
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Pressing business was often left undecided while members in­
dulged in vacuous oratory. Since there were no public audiences, the 
delegates were evidently trying to impress one another. John Banister 
first hinted the worst concerning the desires of the delegates to get 
down to business. Referring to the Congressional question of half-pay 
measures for the ariiQr, he noted that "the greatest ignorance in every 
occurance [sic ] of that kind mixed with an inactivity that permits 
affairs of greatest magnitude to lie dormant and give place to trifles"^ 
was the predominant characteristic of Congress. Richard Henry Lee 
wrote in disbelief, "The delay producing powers of some men, the des­
truction of time under pretext of order, and by long confident speeches, 
that I have never seen less business done in any Assembly than has been 
with us the last six or eight months." A man evidently used to activ­
ity, Thomas Rodney grumbled in writing about Congressional indolence. 
In reference to the problems of finance, his chief complaint was in the 
inability of the members to arrive at a plan of action after agreeing 
on the "pernicious" practice of Tender laws. "A very long debate en­
sued" because some were against recommending to the states the repeal 
of Tender laws, thinking it would give "a fatal stab" to the new money; 
all the rest were in favor of having this ddrie, "but could not agree in 
the manner of doing it," so that "the whole day was taken up in debat­
ing about the form of the resolution suited to the occasion and one 
form after another vras voted out till all parties got bewildered in 
^Burnett, The Continental Congress, p. 319. 
^Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, I, iiU9. 
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the debate and at length adjourned desiring that some member would have 
one ready in the morning."^ 
Writing to John Iredell, William Johnson of Connecticut declared, 
"The great delay in deliberative councils of so numerous a body as Con­
gress must necessarily take place . . . but much time is too often spent 
in debate, and there is no man of sufficient credit or influence to take 
7 
the lead, or give tone to business." John Mathews of South Carolina 
wrote to George Washington, "Congress has not a single means in their 
power to remedy the accumulated evils, and what is worse, there does not 
appear to be a disposition to endeavor at it. Whenever the subject is 
g 
brought up, men shrink from it as if the case was desperate." 
Too often the Continental Congress became an exclusive debating 
club rather than an efficient body of men dedicated to the duty of gov­
erning the society of the nation. Thorny problems were debated, re-
debated and tabled until months and even years passed before final 
solution. The solution often resolved itself, without aid from Congress. 
For example, consider a dispute between Vermont and Mew York— 
The origins of the dispute between Vermont and New York began in 
colonial times. The conflict was between New York and New Hampshire 
because both claimed the right to grant lands in the territory that is 
now Vermont. As early as 17i;9 the Governor of New Hampshire granted 
the first township west of the Connecticut River. In granting this 
territory he: had assuined that it was within the jurisdiction of New 
^Edmund Cody Burnett (ed. ), Letters of Mgabees of the Continen­
tal Congress (10 vols.; Washington, D,CoS Carnegie Institution of 
Washington', 193h), VI, 35. 
"^Ibid., p. 51. ^Ibid., p. 63. 
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Hampshire. By 176ii the Qovemor had granted approximately three million 
acres of the best lands in Connecticut Valley, the Champlain Valley and 
the Southwest, chiefly to New England land speculators.^ The opposition 
in New York against these New Hampshire grants came mainly from a class 
of men known as speculator-proprietors. They were successful in gaining 
a decision against the New Hampshire grants. In 176ii the Privy Council 
declared the west bank of the Connecticut River "to be" the boundary 
between New York and New Hampshire. The decision was received with 
satisfaction by New York speculators, but with apprehension by other 
speculators in New England. If the Privy Council decision had declared 
only that the grants were transferred from the jurisdiction of New Hamp­
shire to that of New York, the speculators in New Hampshire titles would 
have had little to fear. However, the wording of the decision enabled 
New York to state that the lands in dispute were under the jurisdiction 
of New York and had been since 16614..^'^ The titles granted by New Hamp­
shire were therefore Illegal. From this moment land speculators who 
claimed grants under New Hampshire began^their'long struggle against 
New York over these lands. 
The dispute over land grants, however, was only part of the 
drama which in the end produced an additional state to the Union. Back-
country versus Seaboard produced friction which eventually begat a 
separist movement. In the 1760's and 1780's the backcountry inhabi­
tants felt themselves greatly exploited by New York. The struggle 
^Chilton Williamson, Vermont in Quandary; 1763-182^ (Montpelier; 
Vermont Historical Society, 19ij.9), p. 7. 
^Qlbid., p. 11. 
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entered its final phase after the passage of the Intolerable Acts of 
ink. The overthrow of New York's authority was prompted by the pro­
tests of the backcountry merchants against these act. They held con­
ventions to demand redress of grievances, and to demonstrate inter­
colonial solidarity by coercing Great Britain with non-import and 
non-consumption agreements. Seaboard New York sought the cooperation 
of the "inhabitants of the Grants" in these retaliatory measures. This 
gave the inhabitants of the Grants an opportunity to protest not only 
against Great Britain but also against New York. The radicals gained 
strength rapidly. By 1775 they were able to control a Cumberland County 
convention and more protests were levelled against New York than Great 
Britain. Among their protests were; (1) the great expense the courts 
charged; (2) the large increase in the number of lawsuits tried in 
these courts; (3) and the inconvenience and expense of attending them; 
(k) lastly, the excessive salaries of their representatives in the New 
York Assembly and the extravagantly large fees charged by attorneys— 
all of which were "very burthensome and grievous. 
The first step toward independence was taken in 1775 when a call 
was issued by the leaders on the west side of the Green Mountains for 
a convention to determine whether the laws of New York concerning land 
titled should be enforced, whether a method for suppressing their op­
ponents in the Grants could be agreed upon, whether to send an agent to 
the ContinKital Congress, and "whether the Convention will consent to 
12 
Associate with New York, or by themselves in the cause of America." 
The Dorset Convention, as it was called, made clear to the other states 
^^Ibid., p. US' ^^Ibid., p. 55. 
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that it drew a sharp distinction between the dispute with New York and 
the cause of the states in their dispute with Great Britain. It also 
made the decision to appeal for aid east of the Green Mountains. In 
the Connecticut Valley rebellion was simmering. The grievances of this 
region were partly due to the land controversy, but more especially to 
the inequalities between seaboard and backcountry. By 1776 both east 
and west had coalesced under one pledge—the independence from New York 
and the establishment of a new state. 
The significance of this movement is two-fold: It demonstrates 
the problems of integration faced by the new nation, and secondly, the 
refusal of Congress to face and solve such a problem. Vermont had made 
clear at the Dorset Convention the distinction between their dispute 
with New York and the general dispute of all the colonies against Great 
Britain. To the Vermonters there seemed to be no contradiction in thiss 
a separist movement that claimed unity to the whole. That contradiction 
was a problem the Continental Congress faced with all the states. A 
nation in the sense that all were united for the common cause, the 
states were separate from one another in every other aspect. Not only 
did the backcountry feel distinct from the seaboard, the North was dis­
tinct from the South, and each state was a separate entity unto itself. 
Unification was achieved out of a common need, integration was a long 
drying cement that only time, and custom, could solidify. The Contin­
ental Congress, aware of the frailty of such a watery base, undertook 
to solve such problems with reluctance. Congressional tactics, never 
too efficient, often in such cases became sluggish to the point of 
"sleeping it off." In such instances the problem resolved itself. 
hi 
helped only by the sighs of relief issuing forth from Congressional 
chambers. 
Having early in the War declared their independence, with the 
name of New Connecticut, the inhabitants of the Grants sought admission 
to the Union as a distinct state, but because of the opposition of New 
York, Congress shied away from the problem. The Vermonters therefore 
declared that, if Congress was unwilling to receive them, there were 
other alliances they could make. Vermont began to make encroachments 
upon New York on the one side and New Hampshire on the other. In I78O 
John Sullivan wrote a letter to Meschech Weare criticising the delay 
tactics of Congress. "Congress have not yet come to a single resolu­
tion respecting Vermont, though it has been five days on the Tapis. 
By 1781 evidence showed that Vermont was actually in negotiations with 
agents of the British Crown. Congress was then forced to notice the 
dilemma and went so far as to produce a resolution calling for a com­
mittee to investigate Vermont's claims. But in 1782 Samuel Livermore, 
President of Congress, reported: "Nothing material has occurred since 
my last. Congress are come to no determination concerning Vermont." 
They are such divided in opinion about the Steps that ought to be 
taken.Vermont proceeded to set up a separate government, despite 
Congressional reprimands, and eventually was accepted into the Union 
as a separate state, almost by the process of osmosis. 
Congressional indolence was a fault among many. The delegates 
viewed one another with distrust, and looked with suspicion on any sign 
^3Bouton, Documents of New Hampshire, X, 375. 
%bid., p. Ii78. 
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of power in Congress. George Washington made the mistake of voicing 
his concern for the need of "bracing up the Confederation" by monetary 
means to Samuel Osgood. Osgood's reply was not agreeable to Washington's 
viewo "Our danger lies in this—that if permanent Funds are given to 
Congress, aristocratic influence, which predominates in more than a 
major part of the United States will finally establish an arbitrary 
government.The specter of "aristocratic influence" was even more 
feared than the tangible forms of the Congressional bo(^. A carefully 
limited government was instituted to thwart aristocratic influence. Yet 
because of the ambitious tenacles of such a specter all men dedicated 
to the principles of the Revolution must ever be on guard against its 
encroachments. A poor government was raised to withstand the strength 
of wealth. Richard Henry Lee voiced the fear of such strength, and at 
the same time asserted the security of poverty. Speaking out against 
the five per cent Impost, then before the states for ratification, Lee 
wrote, 
I am sorry to be compelled to think so, to me it seems too 
early and too strong an attempt to over leap those fences, 
established by the Confederation to secure the liberties of 
the respective states. Where the possession of power creates 
as it too frequently does, a thirst for more, plausible argu­
ments are seldom wanting to persuade acquiescence.^6 
The Impost proposal would sap the authority of the states to levy taxes, 
which would leave "the all important power of the purse invested in an 
Aristocratic body." Fearing the power of the purse, many delegates pre­
ferred to keep the government in its floundering position rather than to 
^^Bumett, Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, VII, 
iilli. 
^^Ibid., p. Iii6. 
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create an efficient funding system for the effective operation of gov­
ernment. Stephen Higgenson of Massachusetts voted against the five per 
cent Impost for just this reason. "The Impost I always was opposed to, 
and being now confirmed in my opinion, as to the danger of too great an 
influence resulting from it to individuals, already too influential by 
far."^^ By giving the power of the purse to Congress, the sword would 
soon follow. "Let us be cautious how we introduce such radical defects 
into our system, as may furnish the most distant pretext for foreign 
18 
troops to interpose in favor of the Government against the people." 
Suspicion was rampant. An unknown member of Congress feared a 
conspiracy between Morris, Livingston, the French ministers, Spanish 
agents and "some other wealthier Citizens." Such men formed a "phalanx" 
attacking with "great force" those delegates in the Congress who dis­
sented from the policies. "It is their practice to hunt down every man 
that can't be brought over to their views and so many Engines are set 
to work to depress every individual Opposer, that a Ifen must have more 
than a common Share of good fortune to escape them, so that an indepen­
dent Spirit here is in constant state of Warfare.To Henry Laurens, 
Richard Henry Lee prophesied ruin to the country if trustworthy men were 
not fotind. "I am decided in my opinion, that if the ij. States do not 
get into their public councils such of their Men as possess the greatest 
abilities and most integrity, in place of the number that now they 
^^ibid., p. 167. 
^^Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, II, 80. 
^^Burnett, Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, VII, 
618. 
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trust5 our liberties will be greatly endangered indeed." 
The delegates were afraid of any sign of power in the government; 
the people, in turn, distrusted their delegates, and in consequence, 
they disregarded the resolutions of the delegates. A sort of "round 
robin" was instituted, beginning at the top and percolating downward. 
Disobedience was so rampant Caesar Rodney found it necessary to recom­
mend some kind of force to "reduce the people to a due subordination to 
Government," but he also thought that this disaffection among the citi­
zens was founded in "that kind of Careless, Indifference in too many 
who are appointed to the Civil line of Duty, which Created the like 
21 
Indifference and Even Neglect" in the citizens. 
In analyzing the defects of government, Alexander Hamilton attri­
buted them to three causes; (1) an excess of the spirit of liberty, 
"which has made the particular states show jealousy of all power in 
their hands—and this jealousy has led them to exercise a right of 
judging in the last resort of the measures recommended by Congress, 
and of acting according to their own opinions of their propriety, or 
necessity"; (2) a diffidence in Congress of their own powers, "by which 
they have been timid and indecisive in their resolutions, constantly 
making concessions to the states, till they have scarcely left them­
selves the shadow of power"; (3) an insufficient means at the disposal 
of Congress to answer the public needs, and "a vigor to draw forth 
their engagements with the army";—the consequence of which "has been 
to ruin their influence and credit with the army, to establish its 
^^Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, II, 296. 
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Ryden, Letters to and from Caesar Rodney, p. h09. 
dependence on each state separately, rather on them—that is, rather 
22 
than on the whole collectively." It is noteworthy that one of the 
greatest critics of the Articles of Confederation blamed the ineffi­
ciency of government on those who operated it and not on the stmcture 
of that instrument itself. To George Washington, Congress, as represen­
tatives of the states in their united capacity, might properly have 
buttressed its own powers, vaguely defined as they were; instead Con­
gress had persistently catered to the hesitancies of the states and 
thereby "broken the staff in its own hands."23 
Vacillation, suspicion, narrow vision and timidity—all were 
elements making up a national legislature. All important resolutions 
of Congress were issued after long delay. Strongly worded statements 
were revised, edited and re-revised until their strong content was re­
placed with pleadings. "Urgent requests, earnest solicitations, force­
ful pleadings, eloquent appeals from Congress to the states, had become 
as commonplace as changes of the moon, and about as effective for mili­
tary purposes, whether the appeal were for men, for money or for sup­
plies. Time after time resolutions framed in the Congress had more 
of a pleading tone, than one of command. Strong words were ine"vitably 
watered down by the more timid among the delegates. When resolutions 
reached the states the tone was that of a mendicant, and who respects 
the wishes of a beggar? 
^^Richard B.Morris (ed.), The Basic Ideas of Alexander Hamilton 
(New York; Washington Square Press, 1965), p. 7U. 
^^Burnett, Continental Congress, p. IiU8. 
2i^Ibid.. p. ii7U. 
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Congress was hardly energetic in conducting its business, but 
often there were not enough delegates represented to conduct business 
at all. The correspondence of the time shows that much of the writing 
consisted of requests to the various states pleading for enough repre­
sentatives to form a quorum. The President of Congress sent out a 
general circular to the several states. 
I am now to inform you that six states are attending, namely, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina and Georgia and from the state of Pennsylvania, Mr. 
Gardner. It is the mos-t earnest desire of the states, attending 
that your Excellency would urge Delegates appointed to represent 
your State to come forward with all possible expedition as any 
longer delay may be injurious to the Union. 
James Tilton wrote in mortification to his state, Delaware; 
Congress are about to send off another express to urge for­
ward, if possible, a representation from the delinquent states. 
It is mortifying to me, to find Delaware again on the list. 
But sir, the situation of congress is truely alarming; the 
most important business pending and not states enough to take 
it up; whilst those present are fatigued into resentment and 
almost despair, with loitering away their time, to little pur­
pose.^" 
Richard Henry Lee portended ominous consequences if representation did 
not soon become adequate. 
We are remote from having a Congress, as we were nineteen 
days ago—with the southern delegates at Philadelphia and those 
of your State [Thomas Lee Shippen] inclusive, we have but Six 
States and a half represented. But one delegate as yet from 
the eastward, whence formerly proceeded the most industrious 
attention to public business—I do not like . . . this strange 27 
lassitude in those who are appointed to transact public affairs. 
However, if the Continental Congress was having difficulty, there was a 
^^Bumett, Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, 711, 
617. 
^^Ibid., p. . 
^^Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, II, 296. 
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perverse satisfaction in finding that the states were also having a 
difficult time. Richard Henry Lee found it as difficult to gather a 
quorum for business in Virginia as he did in the national government. 
In 1780 he wrote to Theodoric Bland, "It is now sixteen days since our 
Assembly ought to have met, and yet to this day we have not members 
enou^ to make a house, altho' the invasion of our country calls loudly 
28 
for legislative aid." To Caesar Rodney's appeal for legislative 
action, James Booth replied, "No Urgency or Importance of any Business 
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can, I believe induce them to continue here longer than this week."'^^ 
The disorganization of Congress was another cause of impotence. 
All matters of importance were referred to committees. Although small 
in size when originally appointed, these committees gradually grew 
larger as the delegates had second thoughts about the safety of such 
matters in the hands of a few. The more members, the more numerous 
and diverse were the views» When a committee failed to reach a deci­
sion on a problem, the problem was transferred to another committee. 
% this method. Congress hoped to achieve a solution by introducing 
more opinions. As a consequence, many important issues—those issues 
hardest to solve—were bandied about from one committee to another, 
sometimes lost in the shuffle or conveniently forgotten until some 
force greater than inertia compelled them to bring it up again. Most 
of the administrative departments of Congress, such as War, Treasury 
and Foreign Affairs departments, began as standing committees of Con­
gress. But little by little these committees were transformed into 
28ibid., p. 209. 
^^Ryden, Letters to and from Caesar Rodney, p. ii09. 
boards composed partly of members of Congress, partly of non-members. 
Because of the fluctuating membership of Congress the conduct of these 
departments came into the hands of the non-members. They were more 
often than not merchants or businessmen who remained in private enter­
prise while they pursued their official duties, almost without super­
vision. For instance, overseas supplies were administered until I78I 
by committees of Congress whose functions overlapped and whose member­
ship continually changed. The merchants who dominated these committees 
either did the work themselves or assigned it to agents appointed for 
special missions. In domestic supplies these same casual arrangements 
were also applied. The Quartermaster and Commissary departments were 
supervised—but not administered—by shifting committees composed of 
members of Congress and appointed officers. In charge of each depart­
ment was a single executive officer, such as the Quartermaster-General. 
However, in practice the Quartermaster-General neither controlled his 
organization nor was responsible for it= He did not appoint his subor­
dinates, and, in the absence of a bureaucratic system, it was not pos­
sible for him to direct the numberless agents who "swanned over the 
country." These agents acted on their own initiative. "With public 
money in hand and a task to perform, they sallied forth to accomplish 
30 
it by their own deviceso" 
Regardless of the inefficiency of such practices. Congress still 
persisted in operating under this system. EJven more inefficient was 
their practice of placing their own members on these boards, even though 
these members were likely to remain on a short-term basis. Even more 
^Operguson, Power of the Purses p. 73. 
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questionable was the Congressional resistance to "the demands of the 
more business-like members to (|o a step further and replace these boards 
with executive departments having a single responsible head."^^ (My em­
phasis) o Perhaps it is superfluous to suggest that business in these 
departments would have been much more efficient if new members were not 
continually replaced—'before they had time to leam the operations of 
the department. Perhaps it is even more superfluous to suggest that 
responsibility is acquired only if those appointed believe they will be 
held accountable for any action or inaction they take. As Edmxmd Cody 
Burnett points out, Congress had the widest latitude in curing the 
miasma prevalent in its departments. But efforts made to reform their 
departments were thwarted by the hesitant members who feared that "by 
the touch of these new-constructed instruments of power, virtue would 
32 
go out of the body of Congress," 
At no time tintil the end of the war was Congress an efficient 
body. Although looked upon with suspicion, the appointments of a separ­
ate Secretary of War, a separate Secretary of Finance, and a separate 
Secretary of Foreign Affairs added much to the efficiency of the Con­
gressional body. It is especially ironic that not until the last did 
Congress create a separate Secretary of War. Although tte predominant 
preoccupation in Congress was the business of war, until a Secretary 
was appointed the war was handled through an anomalous body entitled 
"The Board of War"„ The chaos prevalent before the appointment of the 
Secretary of War can be evidenced by examination of the Commissary-
3lBurnett, Continental Congress, p. 500. 
3^Ibid. 
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General. It was a puzzlement to Caesar Rodney why prices were so high 
"when there is no other market for those articles"; and, writing to 
John Dickinsons, Rodney suggested reform in the Quarter-Master and Com­
missary departments. 
I must beg leave to submit to you Whether every purchaser 
in the Quarter-Master's and Commissaries departments, being 
obliged to submit his accounts to, and obtaining the Certifi­
cates of their having passed the Inspection of the Supreme 
Executive Authority comprehending the district to which they 
belong, or such other as they or Congress might constitute for 
that purpose—would not in Some measure be a remedy—for tho' 
the people in General are not willing to become informers, 
they are generally free to say the Truth when called upon. 
Especially where they are known and can have easy Access. 
This suggestion was never acted upon. 
The disorganization of the war effort was in part the cause for 
lack of supplies. Richard Henry Lee was surprised to find that "their 
should be a want of flour . . . and proves great want of attention to 
the Commissary General because I well know that any quantity might have 
*5) 
been got in Virginia at a reasonable price." Perhaps if better organ­
ization and better men had staffed the War departments, supplies would 
not have been so scarce, and less odium cast upon the states for their 
lack of patriotism. General Sullivan, at least, cast some of the odium 
where it belonged. Referring to the Commissary-General department, he 
wrote a strongly condemnatory letter to General Washington. 
If their Impudence as well as Indolence did not Baffle all 
Description they would have paid Some little attention to this 
Post after the Extravagent promises they made to your Excel­
lency and myself. We have been led on from Day to Day by their 
false promises till our Stores are again Completely Ebchausted. 
. . . There is neither Faith, honor, or Integrity in the 
33Rycien, Letters to and from Caesar Rodney, p. 299. 
^^Ballagh, Letters of Richard Henry Lee, I, 3^2. 
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Suppliers of this Department and if some Speedy and Effectual 
Remedy is not applied the Same consequences which they brought 
on the Army last winter must take place here.35 
A great deal of the fault lay in an administrative system which 
failed to distinguish between public and private functions. These 
supposedly diverse functions were merged in the normal duties of offi­
cers who served their country by pursuing their private interests. In 
a sense, administrative positions existed to be exploited, and in many 
instances it would have taken superhuman will power for men not to 
avail themselves of these opportunities. With such opportunities ripe 
for the taking it was inevitable that public offices would be abused. 
It should be noted that, after the Revolution, procedures were changed. 
The army was supplied by contract rather than direct purchase by govern­
ment officials. 
The continuous demand for pay by soldiers was not always caused 
by the scarcity of money. Caesar Rodney suggested that a paymaster 
could straighten out some of the chaos. It appeared to Rodney that a 
paymaster was "absolutely necessary" in every Battalion, especially 
when they were separated from the army. "The want of such an officer," 
whose particular business would be to pay the wages of the soldiers, 
added immeasurably to the general confusion. As it was, "the money 
. . . having to go thro' so many hands at present," prevented the regu­
larity of wage disperson. » .as the officers have sufficient to 
employ them in their own departments, it is a pitty but they were re­
lieved of this task."^"^ Had there been a pajnuaster what money there was 
^^Hammond, Letters of Major-General Sullivan, I, 306. 
^^Ferguson, Power of the Purse, p. 195-
^"^Ryden, Letters to and from Caesar Rodney, p. 81;. 
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would have been paid regularly, instead of by the intermittent, haphaz­
ard method that was employed. Samuel Chase, in 1776, composed a plan 
of reform for carrying on the operations of war. "If we expect to suc­
ceed in the present War, We must change our Mode of Conduct, The 
business of the Congress must be placed in different Hands, distinct 
and precise Departments ought to be established, and a Gentleman of the 
military must be of the Board of ¥ar."^® Such simple solutions found 
difficult passage through the labyrinthine channels of Congressional 
thought. As a wry old sage once said, "Simple solutions often are so 
simple that a fool can't leam them; so hard that a lazy man won't." 
However, no matter how inefficient Congress became, it must be 
said that never before had such great expense been experienced in colo­
nial wars. As Ferguson points out, while the conflict lengthened into 
years a business boom was stimulated, which caused a price inflationj, 
which in turn "spurred government and private buying." Domestic pro­
ducts and services rose in price. Since Congress rarely had money 
equal to its immediate obligations, it could not economize by planning 
ahead. "Forced to construct the apparatus of government amidst the 
havoc and crisis of war, it was further handicapped by a realization 
that public opinion would tolerate little centralization of power. 
Iftitil the end of the fighting, supply and procurement remained a hur-
39 
ried improvisation in the face of emergency." Furthermore, the 
encompassing confusion almost completely prevented public officers 
from effectively supervising supply and demand. Consequently, the 
38Hammond, Letters of Ma.lor-General Sullivan, I, 306. 
3%erguson, Power of the Purse, p. 27. 
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costs were increased by inefficiency, waste and corruption. A further 
drain on the federal resources resulted from the excessive number of 
employees in the civil service attached to the army. Large numbers of 
personnel were kept at tasks requiring only a fraction of their time. 
The real expense of the war was therefore enormous. A member of Con­
gress lamented, "The Avarice of our people and the extravagant prices 
of all commodities joined with the imperfect management of our Affairs, 
ho 
would expend the mines of Chili and Peru." 
28. 
^^Bumett, Letters of Members of the Continental Congress, III, 
CHAPTER V 
"THE GREATEST NUISANCE TO MANKIND IS MAN" 
The Constitution of the United States gained its flexibility and 
strength from its "implied powers". The Articles of Confederation was 
narrowly construed by the delegates, but this need not have been the 
case. As early as 1781 certain members of the Continental Congress 
tri^d to make use of "implied powers". The argument over what consti-
/ ̂  
tuted a majority of states to pass legislation is a case in point. The 
requirement that a majority of nine states must be obtained before leg­
islation could be passed is one of the great criticisms of the Articles. 
Some delegates felt—as do modem historians^— that such a rule would 
block efficient government. These same delegates insisted that the 
following clause in Article IX implied that a majority of nine states 
could be interpreted to mean five states: 
^Andrew C. McLaughlin, describing the congressional attempt to 
procure the five per cent Impost resolution, agreed with George Wash­
ington, "I do not conceive we can exist long as a nation without having 
lodged somewhere a power, which will pervade the whole Union in as 
energetic a manner as the authority of the State governments extends 
over the several states." McLaughlin, The Confederation and the Con­
stitution, p. 88. Edmand Cody Burnett stressed, in The Continental 
Congress, the inability of the government to attain an efficient fund­
ing system through the process of ratification the Articles of Confed­
eration provided. Each time i;his proposal was submitted it was blocked 
by one or another state, while yet many others accepted the proposal. 
Eight states might accept the Impost, but the one state that did not 
prevented the proposal from becoming law. Both historians maintained 
a midway position in their evaluation of the Articles of Confederation. 
The Confederation was not as heinous as some historians portrayed, but 
certain mechanical defects—such as the stipulation that nine states 
must agree to pass legislation—prevented it from being a competent 
instrument of government. 
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The united states in congress assembled shall never engage 
in a war, nor grant letters of marque and reprisal in time of 
peace, nor enter into any treaties or alliances, nor coin 
money, nor regulate the value thereof, nor ascertain the sums 
and expenses necessary for the defence and welfare of the 
united states, nor appropriate money . . . unless nine states 
assent to the same: nor shall a question of any point, except 
for adjourning from day to day be determined, unless by the 
votes of a majority of the united states in Congress assembled. 
Thomas Rodney recorded the outcome of the debate in his diary. Madison, 
Duane, Root, Witherspoon and Wolcott first argued that the Confederation 
had enumerated powers which could not be efficiently utilized if it 
required the assent of nine states. Therefore, this Article should be 
interpreted to mean that a majority of nine—which was five—could 
decide the business of Congress. "These men stated emphatically that 
unless this construction was put on the clause the government wouldn't 
be able to do much." To Thomas Rodney, as with a majority of the mem­
bers, this interpretation smacked of tyranny. "Here [we] had the 
opportunity of seeing the maxim 'all men would be tyrants if could get 
the power.' Was sorry to see such a keen struggle to increase the 
power of Congress beyond what the states intended so early as but the 
third day after completing the Confederation."^ After the debate had 
spent itself and the smoke cleared, it was decided that no business 
would be undertaken unless nine states were represented, and no vote 
on an issue could be passed except with the assent of seven. The broad 
constructionists were defeated in the first issue that confronted them, 
and, as we shall see, would be continually defeated—with just one ex­
ception. 
^Solberg, Federal Convention and the Formation of the Union, p. k2. 
^Burnett, Letters of Members of the Continental Congress. VI, 21;. 
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In March, 1781, Madison proposed to amend the thirteenth Article, 
"Every State shall abide by the determinations of the United States in 
Congress on all questions which by this Confederation are submitted to 
them."^ This article vested the Confederation with an implied power to 
enforce and "carry into effect" all the Articles against "any State 
which shall refuse to abide by their determination." Madison realized, 
through previous experience, that implied powers carried no weight with 
the members of Congress. Therefore, he proposed to spell it out in 
plain language with an amendment, "In case any one or more of the Con­
federate States shall refase to abide by the determinations of the 
United States in Congress or to observe all the Articles of Confedera­
tion as required in the thirteenth amendment the United States is 
authorized to employ the force of the United States to compel such 
states ... to fulfill their federal engagements."^ Writing to Jef­
ferson, Madison feared the outcome of his proposed amendment. Arming 
Congress with coercive powers was necessary due to "the deficiency of 
some states which are most capable of yielding their apportioned sup­
plies." Without the necessary force in the general government "the 
whole confederacy may be insulted." If the states refused to ratify 
the amendment the government would be "in a worse position" since, as 
the Confederation originally stood there was "an implied right of coer­
cion against the delinquent states and the exercise of it by Congress 
7 
whenever a palpable necessity occurs will probably be acquiesced in." 
^Solberg, Federal Convention and the Formation of the Union, p. it2. 
Hutchinson and RachsL, Papers of Madison, IV, 3^2. 
^Ibid., p. 353. "^Ibid. 
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Both the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution of 1789 
can be subjected to strict and broad interpretations. Early in the 
history of the Articles of Confederation certain delegates tried to in­
stitute the principle of Implied powers. Their failure produced a 
narrowly constructed government; a purposely weak goverrunent which 
would safeguard the rights of citizens against the usurpation inherent 
in power. A statement can be made with some validity, following the 
lines of logic stated above; strict constructionalists gained control 
of the Articles at an early date, and they developed the government 
along tight or state lines. Conversely, broad constructionalists 
gained control of the Constitution early, and developed the new govern­
ment along loose or national lines. If the nationalists had controlled 
the government early, would the Articles of Confederation have survived? 
When it is considered that tlie delegates in Congress incessantly fought 
against any broad construction of the Articles, that they consistently 
obstructed any portent of strong goverranent, that they purposely kept 
the government poor by refusing Congress a national funding system, it 
can be stated that the Confederation fell through the devices of strict 
construction. Through the timidity of delegates the Articles of Con­
federation became a brittle instrument. The rapidity of change cannot 
be bound by the letter of the law. To accommodate the changing needs 
of a country, laws must be elastic to meet new exigencies. A brittle 
institution cannot bend under the tension; narrow construction can only 
break under the vicissitudes of time that have gone beyond the concepts 
of the past. 
There was only one successful attempt at a broad constiniction 
of the Articles. The attempt succeeded in part because the strict 
6k 
eonstractionalists were notoriously short-sighted and men, such as 
Madison, utilized tactics that took advantage of that hitherto limiting 
tendency. On the very last day of 1781 Congress passed an act incor­
porating the Bank of North America. Not only was there nc clause of 
the Articles which authorized Congress to create corporations, the 
Second Article specifically stipulated that "Each state retains its 
sovereignty, freedom, and Independence, and every power, jurisdiction 
and Right which is not by the Confederation expressly delegated to the 
O 
United States in Congress assembled.The validity of the charter was 
challenged by several delegates, but as Madison explained to Edmund 
Pendleton, "When the scheme was originally proposed to Congress for 
their approbation and patronage," the delegates promised to incorporate 
it "when it was ripe for operation." When the incorporation bill was 
introduced on the floor of Congress, those delegates who had promised 
were bound to honor it, that, or awkwardly withdraw their pledge. Ife,d-
ison further explained, "The competency of Congress to such an act had 
been called into question in the first instance, but the subject not 
lying in so near and distinct view, the objections did not prevail." 
Those delegates who had pledged themselves might have thought that in 
the hazy future* such a plan would be lost in the shuffle, but they had 
reckoned without the perseverance of their oponents. In the final de­
bate there was a show of resistance. "On the last occasion, the general 
opinion . . . was that the Confederation gave no such power and that 
the exercise of it would not avail the institution."^ 
O 
Solberg, The Federal Convention and Formation of the Union, p. I4.2. 
^Hutchinson and Rachel, Papers of Madison, IV, 3^3. 
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James Wilson then -undertook the charter's defence. The Second 
Article of the Confederation Wilson cast aside at the outset as entirely-
irrelevant to the question. 
To many purposes the United States are to be considered as 
one undivided nation; and as possessed of all the rights and 
powers, and properties by the law of nations incident to such. 
Whenever an object occurs in the direction of which no particu­
lar state is competent, the management of it must of necessity 
belong to the United States in Congress assembled. 
After this broadly interpreted argument it is well to note E. S. Coi-
win's statement, "The reflection is suggested that if the Articles of 
Confederation had continued to subject this [Wilson's] canon of con­
struction, they might easily have come to support an even greater struc­
ture of derived powers than the Constitution of the United States at 
11 
this moment." Instead of being an instrument of weakness, the Arti­
cles could have been a government of strength through its inherent, 
latent powers. Strict construction explicitly follows the letter of 
the law, latent powers are implicit and therefore require congressional 
willingness to draw them out. The people and the congressional dele­
gates feared government. Guarding their individual rights jealously, 
it would seem that in the end the people could not pardon the Articles 
of Confederation for being a national government despite all their ef­
forts to the contrary. The Articles of Confederation became a govern­
ment, not for the people, but despite the people. 
It should be noted that, once instituted, the Bank of North 
America performed an important service to the United States during the 
S. Corwin, "The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between 
the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia 
Convention," American Historical Review, XXX (192^), 529. 
^^Ibid. 
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years Robert Morris was Superintendent of Finance. From I782 to 1781; 
Robert Morris borrowed a total of one million and a quarter dollars 
from the Bank. In time the directors of the Bank decided enough money 
had been loaned to Congress. So Morris sold $200,000 par value of the 
government's shares in the Bank for $300,000 and reduced the national 
debt by that amount. The next year he sold the remainder of the govern­
ment's shares to Dutch investors. By the time he had retired from 
office, the debt of Congress to the Bank had been paid, and Congress 
12 
was no longer a stockholder. 
The Articles of Confederation have been subjected to inimical 
criticism or downright condemnation or, conversely, applauded—by those 
trying to justify positions adverse to the Constitution—as the true 
instrument of democracy. I do not agree with the Progressive historians 
who maintain that the period of history under the Articles of Confedera­
tion were halycon days of ideal government. In many ways it was a 
period of turmoil, confusion, discord, and disorganization. I insist 
only that the Articles of Confederation, as an instrument of government, 
was not the cause of the problems. Those who managed the affairs of 
government and those for whom that government was instituted failed to 
utilize well the instrument created for their well-being. No matter 
how grand the plan, it will always fail if a whole people refuse to 
abide by its tenets. The temper of the people affected the business of 
Congress. If Congress had difficulties during the war, ironically they 
had even greater difficulties during the peace. The seeds of dissipa­
tion that were sown during the war bloomed forth more profusely after 
Jensen, The New Nation, p. 83. 
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the war was ended. Stephen Higginson vividly portrayed the scene, "The 
habits of indolence and dissipation contracted during the war, are very 
much against our making a right improvement of the advantages we have 
in possession." The people in general had lived better than ever before, 
and usually in a better manner than their budgets could afford. 
And their Ideas can not now be brought to comport, with their 
real situation and means of living . . . was there force in the 
government to compel the payment of Taxes, the Cure might be 
accelerated. Bat in our situation, without Energy and without 
Funds beside what may be drawn from the people by Taxes^ it is 
a serious and important Question, whether our Government may 
not get unhinged, and a revolution take place, before the Cure 
can be effected, and the people at large discover-,- that to 
secure their Liberties and the great bulk of their property a 
certain portion of the latter must be parted with.l5 
Only through "sad experience" would the people learn that "the Sover-r 
eignty of the States must in a degree be transferred to the Union and 
the people at large not so violently opposed to every degree of implicit 
obedience. 
Andrew McLaughlin found the theories of the day the real source 
of mis government. "Because of sinful man, government, an evil in it­
self, was necessary, but it should be looked upon with suspicion and 
guarded with jealous care." With such concepts prevalent it was diffi­
cult to argue for efficient government and "to point to the necessity 
of punishment and restrainto" It was much easier for the people to 
wield power than to give that power to the nation. "Local authority 
was near at hand and in its new dignity was not very different from the 
old colonial administration. The War had begun against general govem-
"To Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higgenson," Annual Report of 
the American Historical Association for the Year I896 (Washington, D,C„5 
Government Printing Office, 1897), p. 7itl. 
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mentj why should implicit obedience be paid to the Congress of the Uni-
ted States, clamoring for power and taxes as George III?" ^ The Arti­
cles of Confederation could have worked. That it did not was due to 
the temper of the timres, the blatant disregard for authority, and the 
suspicion and distrust of the people toward all government.American 
thought in the eighteenth century believed the nature of man was evil. 
As Cecelia Kenyon points out in "Men of Little Faith," the people of 
the late eighteenth century thought "the dominant motive of human be­
havior was self-interest, and this drive fotind its most extreme polit­
ical expression in the insatiable lust for power. This dreadful lust 
l^McLaughlin, Confederation and the Constitution, p. itlo 
^^The suspicion and distrust of the people toward all government 
can be amply documented from The Antifederalist Papers o As a Massachu­
setts Antifederalist wrote under the pen name "Agrippa", "It has been 
proved, by indisputable evidence, that power is not the grand principle 
of union among the parts of a very extensive empire; and that when this 
principle is pushed beyond the degree necessary for rendering justice 
between man and man^ it debases the character of individuals, and 
renders them less secure in their persons'and property," p. 27. Fear 
of government extended itself to such an extreme that the national 
capital was seen as the center of corroptiono "The Federal Farmer" 
wrote, "We are not to suppose all our people are attached to free 
government, and the principles of common law, but that many thousands 
of them will prefer a city governed not on republican principles. 
This city, and the government of it, must indubitably take their tone 
from the characters of the men, who from the nature of its situation 
and institution must collect there. This city will not be established 
for productive labor . . . However brilliant and honorable this col­
lection may be, if we expect it will have any sincere attachments to 
simple and finigal republicanism, to that liberty and mild government, 
which is dear to the laborious part of a free people, we must assuredly 
deceive ourselves." p., 122. The fear of power that prevailed in the 
Confederation period did not change overnight and was still prevalent 
while states debated the ratification of the Constitution. The major­
ity of men in government were Antifederalists-, fearful, as the people, 
of strong government. Morton Borden (ed.), Antifederalist Papers 
(East Lansing; Michigan State University Press, 1965). ~ 
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for power was regarded as the universal characteristic of the nature 
17 
of man, which could be controlled but not eradicated." ' With such 
thoughts prevailing, could government be anything more than weak? 
^'''cecelia Kenyon, "Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federalists on 
the Nature of Representative Government," William and Mary Quarterly, 
Third Series, XII (19^5), 12. 
CHAPTER- VI 
THE CONFEDERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 
The seeds of disaffection, dissipation and disrespect were soxm 
during the Revolution. Habits acquired and slowly solidified into 
custom are not rectified by the reform of a small number of delegates 
sitting in a Congress no longer holding the esteem of their constituents. 
Respect cannot be regained by the reformation: of the system that caused 
its loss. The Federal Convention was called ostensibly to reform the 
Articles of Confederation. But the movers behind the Convention be­
lieved that more than reform was necessary to rectify a situation fast 
becoming anarchic. Washington's alarm at the weakness of the Confeder­
ation was deepened as disorders in Massachusetts, in the Fall of 1786, 
seemed to portend a crisis for the nation. "I predict the worst conse­
quences from a half-starved, limping government always moving upon 
crutches and tottering at every step."^ That this limping condition 
was the product of mismaaagement was no longer the concern of Washing­
ton, as it had been during the Revolution. More drastic measures were 
now needed; accusations leveled against incompetent officials relieved 
only the spleen. No matter the decision of the leaders, the question 
arises; why did the people disobey the Confederation, and obey the 
Constitution? It would seem that the wages of sin, and the price of 
^Morris, "The Confederation Period and the American Historian," 
William and Mary Quarterly. Third Series, XIII (19^6), 139. 
70 
71 
excessive liberty were lessons dearly learned. "Sad experience" had 
taught the value of restraint. 
In the debates over ratification of the Constitution it is note­
worthy that arguments centered around the structure of the Constitution, 
not the Confederation; and the argaraents against the Confederation con­
sisted mainly of accusations of mismanagement, loss of respect, and the 
people's open disregard of governmental restraint. Governor Huntington 
of Connecticut declared, "If we look into history, we shall find that 
the common avenue which tyranny has entered in, and enslaved the nations 
p 
who were once free, has been their not supporting the government."'^ 
Alexander Hamilton, in the New York debate, cast s|.spersions on the 
delegates' excessive loyalty to their states. 
In my experience of public affairs, I have constantly re­
marked, in the conduct of the members of Congress, a strong 
and uniform attachment to the interests of their own state 
. . . The early connections we have formed, the habits and 
prejudices in which we have been bred, fix our affections 
so strongly that no future objects of association can easily 
eradicate them. 
Something stronger than amendments to the Articles of Confederation was 
needed to "eradicate them." James Madison, in the Virginia debates, 
declared that the people's disobedience produced the present necessity 
for new government. The Constitution held no powers that had not been 
vested in the Confederation—the only difference was that the Confeder­
ation held them in theory and the Constitution in fact. 
p 
Jonathan Elliot, The Debates in the Several State Conventions 
on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as Recommended by the 
General Convention at Philadelphia in 178? (6 vols.; Philadelphia; 
J, B. Lippincott Company, 1891), II, 198. 
^Ibid., p. 266. 
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Did we not perceive, in the early stages of war, when Con­
gress was the idol of America, and when in pursuit of the 
object most dear to America, that they were attached to their 
states? Afterwards, the whole current of their affections 
was to the states . . . the powers vested in the proposed 
government are not so much an augmentation of powers in the 
general government, as a change rendered necessary for the 
purpose of giving efficacy to those which were vested in it 
before. It cannot escape any gentleman that this power, in 
theory, exists in the Confederation as fully as in this Con­
stitution.^ 
It should be noted that Madison mentions the time "when Congress was 
the idol of America." This can also imply the Congressional inability 
to maintain that respect, and its fall from grace. 
Throughout the state debates one is struck by the fact that argu­
ments against the Confederation were not on its structure. All arguments 
against the Confederation centered on the condition of the country, the 
defects of the delegates, the disobedience of the people. John Marshallj 
later to be the arch nationalist who upheld federal power, argued that 
"the inability of Congress and the failure of the states to comply with 
the constj-tutional requisitions" rendered -resistance to the enemy more 
difficult. "The weakness of that government caused our troops to be 
against us which ought to have been on our side, and prevented all re­
sources of the community from being called at once into action ... a 
bare sense of duty, or a regard to propriety, is too feeble to induce 
men to comply with obligations."'^ Melancthon Smith of New York, argu­
ing over the Constitutional provision for legislation, inadvertently 
summed up the difficulty of tha Confederation; 
If the people have a high sense of liberty, government 
should be congenial to this spirit, calculated to cherish 
the love of liberty, while yet it had sufficient force to 
^Ibid., III, 2^8. ^Ibid., p. 288. 
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restrain licentiousness. Government operates upon the spirit 
of the people, as well as the spirit of the people operates 
upon it; and if they are not conformable to each other, one 
or other will prevail.^ 
In the Pennsylvania debate, James Wilson described in vivid 
detail the disgraceful situation of the country. "The commencement of 
peace was the commencement of every disgrace and distress that could 
befall a people in a peaceful state." Extravagant importations ruined 
the economy, "nor could we derive a revenue from their excess." 
Through the inability to gain trade in foreign markets, "the Confeder­
ation lost national importance. Devoid of national energy, we could 
7 
not carry into execution our own resolutions, decisions, or laws." 
In Virginia, Madison warned that the loss of liberty was endan­
gered more through dissensions than through the fear of tyranny. By 
reviewing history, "it can be found that the loss of liberty very often 
resulted from factions and divisions; from local considerations, which 
eternally lead to quarrels . . . internal dissensions have more fre­
quently demolished civil liberty, than a tenacious disposition in 
g 
rulers to retain any stipulated powers." 
The important question, however, was asked by John Lansing of 
New York. "If the state government's have been unable to compel the 
g 
people to obey their laws, will Congress be able to coerce them?" 
Article III of the Confederation proclaimed; "The said states hereby 
severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each other, for 
their common defence, the security of their Liberties, and their mutual 
and general welfare, binding themselves to assist each other, against 
^Ibid.. II, 375. 
^Ibid.. p. 1^31. 
"^Ibid.. p. 250. 
^Ibid., III, 90. 
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all force offered to, or attacks made upon them, or any of them, on 
account of religion, sovereignty, trade, or any other pretence what­
ever. This declaration of unity was a charge no state accepted; a 
law on paper, but ignored in practice. Question; Why did the people 
disregard the Articles of Confederation, and accept the Constitution? 
Hypothesis: Freedom rampant sacrifices the common good for individual 
selfishness. Individual selfishness in turn produces anarchy, and 
anarchy endangers personal freedom. Instability does not produce 
prosperity, and the individual's pocketbook is exposed to a competition 
without rules. Stephen Higginson prophesied correctly; "Sad experi­
ence alone will fully satisfy the body of this people that the Sover­
eignty of the Several States must in a degree be transferred to the 
Union and the people at large not so violently opposed to every degree 
of implicit obedience.Experience had taught the need for temper­
ance. It had also taught that freedom without restraint often sacri­
fices personal security. The people, in short, were ready to obey. 
And just perhaps, George Washington, as first President under the 
newly constituted government, held more respect than a whole Congress 
of puny delegates. 
The Antifederalists did not deny there were defects in the Arti­
cles of Confederation. They were merely cautious where they believed 
the Federalists to be reckless. John Lansing of New York expressed the 
general Antifederalist view; "... however much I may be disposed to 
to perpetuate the union, however sensible of the defects of the Confed-
lOSolberg, Federal Convention and the Formation of the Union, p. ii.3. 
Jameson, "Letters of Stephen Higginson," Annual Report of the 
American Historical Association for the Year I896, p. ^1. 
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eratiorij I cannot help differing from those gentlemen who are of the 
opinion it is incapable of amelioration." Instead of breaking com­
pletely with the past, and aware of the historical importance of such 
an undertaking, Lansing wished to be cautious in reform by amending 
the Articles of Confederation. The form of government was not what 
produced the ills of the "present situation," why, then, recklessly 
abandon it? 
That we have encountered embarrassments and are distressed 
for want of money, is undoubted; but the causes which could 
not be cojitrolled by any system of government, have princi­
pally contributed to embarrass and distress us. Sir, the 
instance adduced from the history of the Jewish theocracy 
evinces that there are certain situations in communities which 
will unavoidably lead to results similar to those we experi­
ence. The Israelites were unsuccessful in war, they were 
sometimes defeated by their enemies; instead of reflecting 
that these calamities were occasioned by sins, they sought 
relief in the appointment of a king, in imitation of their 
neighbor8.12 
The Antifederalists wished to eradicate the ,"sins" of the people without 
endangering their freedom. The Federalists believed correction lay in 
centralizing the government and insuring obedience by coercive powers. 
One is tempted to mention obliquely in this instance, the Whiskey Re­
bellion and the large force led by Hamilton, as an example of this 
insurance policy^ With such examples of "coercive powers" one is also 
tempted to quote still another sage^ "There is a certain relief in 
change, even though it be from bad to worse; as I have found in riding 
a horse. It is often a comfort to shift one's position and be bruised 
in a new place." 
12 
Elliot,,Debates in the Several States, II, 223. 
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A large number of men in 178? and 1788 were Antifederalists. 
Add to this the fact that history was on the side of the Antifederalist 
theory of republican government, and it is doubly astonishing that they 
went down to defeat. 
Montesquieu taught that republican governments could be 
feasible only in small territories. At the center of the 
theoretical expression of the Antifederalist opposition to 
the increased centralization of power in the national govern­
ment was the belief that a republican government was possible 
only for a relatively small territory and an equally small 
population.^3 
It is therefore argued that a large republic was impossible because the 
center of the government was too distant from the people. The interest 
of the people in government would decrease; and when this happened they 
would grow completely disinterested in government. Before the debate 
over ratification required him to change his view, Alexander Hamilton 
was of the same opinion. 
It is a known fact in human nature, that its affections are 
commonly weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness 
of the object. Upon the same principle that a man is more 
attached to his family than to his neighborhood, to his neigh­
borhood than to the community at large, the people of each 
state would be apt to feel a stronger biats toward their local 
governments than toward the government of the Union, lii 
The Antifederalists centered their attack, both inside and out­
side the state debates, on the construction of the Constitution. The 
arguments against the Constitution centered mainly around these points? 
(1) the elections of representatives and senators were not frequent 
enough to insure responsibility to their constituents; (2) one repre­
sentative for every thirty thousand people was too few; (3) the Senate 
^^Kenyon, "Men of Little Faith," William and Mary Quarterly, p„ 
^Alexander Hamiltoii, John Jay, James Madison, The Federalist 
(New York; The Modem Library, 1937), No. 17, pp. 102-103. 
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was to help appoint certain officers and were the Judges on impeachment 
of such officers5. (Ij.) with the Senate holding such powers, the legislature 
blended into the executive and judicial departments; (5) the Vice-Presi­
dent was a useless officer, however, he was also to be the president of 
the Senate, and in case of division, was to have the deciding vote; 
(6) there was no bill of rights; (7) the new constitution provided for 
a consolidation of the several states and not a confederation. 
The Constitution proposed that the first House of Representatives 
should consist of sixty-five members, and afterwards the ratio of repre­
sentation should not exceed one representative for thirty thousand 
people. This provision was a chief component of the charge that the 
Constitution was not sufficiently democratic. Sixty-five men could not 
possibly represent the variety of interests throughout so large a coun­
try. Those most likely to be left out were the more democratic or 
"middling elements" in society. Melancthon Smith, in the debate over 
ratification in New York, declared, "The great easily form associations; 
the poor and middling class form them with difficulty." The "middling 
class" could unite only under "some great man, unless some popular 
demogogue, who will probably be destitute of principle. A substantial 
y e o m a n ,  o f  s e n s e  a n d  d i s c e r n m e n t ,  w i l l  h a r d l y  e v e r  b e  c h o s e . I t  
was a rule of Whig ideology that participation in government was the 
legitimate concern only of those who possessed property—for the pro­
tection of which, government had been originally founded. Melancthon 
Smith was not opposing this ideology, he was arguing that this ideology 
^^Staughton Lynd, Anti-Federalism in Dutchess County, New York 
(Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1962), p. 88. 
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was not pervasive enough in the Constitution. Sixty-five representa­
tives produced an elite. That only the most powerful of the propertied 
classes would have an active voice in policy, was Smith's accusation. 
The basic fear of the Antifederalists was an inbred concern that 
government under the Constitution would be controlled by the "great", 
and would not truly reflect the interests of all groups in the commun­
ity and would almost certainly become oppressive. In fact, "Majoritar-
ians did not always act in democratic ways," as Richard B. Morris points 
out; "... nor did they seem always willing to abide by the will of the 
majority. Witness the shocking abuse of power by radicals of Pennsyl­
vania who established the state constitution by fiat and did not dare 
submit it to the people. In fact, they went so far as to require the 
people to take an oath to support the constitution as a prerequisite 
for franchise.This railroading tactic was also apparent in Pennsyl­
vania's ratification of the Constitution. 
The cause of the Antifederalist defeat lay in their inability to 
compromise among themselves and to provide an alternative plan to the 
one proposed by the Federalists. The term "Antifederalist" seems, 
after close examination, to be a convenient tag placed on the men who 
opposed the Constitution. Their ranks did not embody a clear-cut poli­
tical philosophy that all Antifederalists affirmed and propagated. 
They were instead a heterogeneous group of men thrown together by one 
factor; opposition to the Constitution. Many felt the Constitution was 
strong; others believed the Constitution was too weak. Power should be 
^^Morris, "The Confederation Period and the American Historian," 
William and Mary Quarterly, p. 1^6. 
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equally distributed, and then again the House of Representatives should 
be the strongest. Many Antifederalists believed that man could govern 
without a strong central government, while others held that human nature 
17 everywhere was grasping, evil and rapacious. Against the united, 
well-organized opposition, the Antifederalists crumbled to defeat. Mr. 
Randal of Massachusetts acidly wondered out loud about the heavy artil­
lery the Federalists used in the state debates: 
An old saying is that "a good thing don't need praising"; 
but it takes the best men in the state to gloss this Constitu­
tion, which they say is the best that human wisdom can invent. 
In praise of it we hear the reverent clergy, judges of the 
Supreme Court, and the ablest lawyers, exerting their utmost 
abilities. Now, sir, suppose all this artillery was turned 
the other way, and these great men would speak half as much 
against it, we might complete our business and go home in 
forty-eight hours.18 
Whatever the inner division, the Antifederalists were united in 
their criticism of the Constitution. Ifeny of the objections were cogent 
arguments bordering on prophecy. Despite some extreme objections, the 
criticisms against the Constitution were an imposing analysis of its 
defects. Because they show the Antifederalist ability to cut incisively 
to the heart of the matter, George Mason's objections are the best. 
"The president of the United States has no Constitutional Council, a 
thing unknown in any safe and regular government. He will therefore be 
unsupported by proper information and advice, and will generally be 
directed by minions and favorites, or he will become a tool of the 
17Morton Borden (ed.), The Antifederalist Papers (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 1965), pp. 7-lij.. 
1P 
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S e n a t e . W h e n  t h e  c a b i n e t  s y s t e m  d i d  e v o l v e ,  i t  e v o l v e d  e x t r a - c o n s t i -
tutionally and without cabinet responsibility. Mason also foresaw the 
rift that developed between the northern and southern states economic­
ally t 
By requiring only a majority to make all commercial and 
navigation laws, the five Southern States, whose produce and 
circumstances are totally different from that of the eight 
Northern and Eastern states, may be ruined, for such rigid and 
premature regulations may be made as will enable the merchants 
of the Northern and Eastern states not only to demand exorbi­
tant freight, but to monopolize the purchase of the commodities 
at their own price. Whereas requiring two-thirds of the mem­
bers present in the Houses would have produced mutual modera­
tion, promised the general interest and removed insuperable 
objection to the adoption of this government. 
It is apropos to note that in the Federal Convention differences 
of opinion did not revolve around basic principles, but around the 
vested interests of each state. Self-interest created controversy, 
not basic differences in ideology. In the compromise over the naviga­
tion laws and slave trade, South Carolina and the North "horse-traded". 
South Carolina wished to raise the restrictions of the slave trade for 
twenty years, and the North wanted to build up their shipping industry. 
The South therefore agreed to vote for the proposition that only a 
majority in both Houses would be needed to pass navigation laws, and 
the North agreed to extend the slave traffic for twenty more years. 
Tariffs could be pushed through favorable to the North, which could 
prove harmful to the South. Bat twenty more years of slave trade 
enabled the South to solidify her "peculiar institution." 
^%olberg, Federal Convention and the Formation of the Union, 
p. 336. 
^^Ibid.. p. 337. 
81 
A further objection of Mason's was that. 
Under their own constmction of the general clause, at the 
end of the enumerated powers, the Congress may grant monopolies 
in trade and commerce, constitute new crimes, inflict unusually 
and severe punishments, and extend their powers as far as they 
shall think proper; so that the State legislatures have no 
security for the powers now presumed to remain to them, or the 
people for their rights.21 
This suspicion has not been negated with proof to the contrary. 
Most Antifederalists believed they were preserving a national 
government in their defence of the Articles of Confederation, In the 
debate over ratification, when accused otherwise, they protested that 
they also thought in national terms. General Heath of Massachusetts 
proclaimed, 
I consider myself not as an inhabitant of Massachusetts, 
but as a citizen of the United States. % ideas and views are 
commensurate with the continent; they extend in length from 
the St. Croix to St. Maria and in breadth from the Atlantic to 
the Lake of the Woods; for over all this extensive territory 
is the federal government to be extended,22 
The Antifederalists, in essence, were arguing for a national government 
of restricted powers. "We ought to be jealous of all rulers,was 
their watchword. 
Like the Founding Fathers, like the men of their age, they 
were great constitutionalists. They were also first-generation 
republicans, still self-consciously so, and aware that their 
precious form of government was as yet an experiment and had 
not proved its capacity for endurance. Its greatest enemy was 
man's lust for power and the only thing which could hold this 
in check, they were convinced, was a carefully written and 
properly constructed constitution,2^ 
^^Ibid., p. 338. 
^^Elliot, Debates in the Several States, II, 13. 
^^Ibid., p, 28. 
oh 
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In suimary, many of the Antifederalist criticisms were valid. 
The Senate did become a "rich man's clubj" and more responsive to the 
rich than to the poor; the federal government did come to overshadow 
the state governments; the Constitution did not lessen sectional ar^i-
mosities; a spoils system did evolve; the control of government by rich 
families, the tremendous expense of court cases, the possibility of 
minor rebellions against excise taxes, ar^d the prediction that there 
2^ 
would be no limit to the national debt —all were predicted by the 
Antifederalists, and proven through time. The great conundrum etern­
ally harrassing man, "Perfection is not the lot of humanity," was the 
subject of Bobert R. Livingston's opening speech at Poughkeepsieo 
"o . . perhaps, were the gentlemen on this floor to compare their sen­
timents on this subject, no two of them would be found to agree., Nay, 
such is the weakness of our judgment, that it is more than probable 
that, if a perfect plan was offered to our choice, we should conceive 
it defective, and condemn it." Robert R. Livingston was speaking 
against the Articles of Confederation. The same speech could have 
been said by those opposed to the Constitution. Human imperfection 
was the cause of the Confederation's fall. Ratification of the new 
Constitution was achieved, in part, through the people's realization of 
their transgressions. The Federalists held a double victoryg a new 
Constitution built out of the hard lessons learned from the old, and a 
people ready to obey, for the rewards of stability—and the fear of 
failure a second time. 
2"̂  
-'Borden, Antifederalist Papers, pp. 7-la. 
Of-
""Elliot, Debate in the State Conventions. II, 210. 
EPILOGUE 
The problems the Federal Convention faced were, essentially, the 
same as those faced by the drafters of the Articles of Confederation, 
If nothing else, the Articles of Confederation made it possible to fur­
ther improve a republican system of government it had initially began^ 
The problem of selfish interests versus national interests confronted 
the drafters of both the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution. 
In some cases the Confederation solved problems of self-interest without 
compromise. For instance, the Articles of Confederation solved the 
western land controversy, with all benefits directed to the federal 
government. 
Only once did Congress demonstrate firmness in the face of state 
opposition, and its success demonstrates the congressional potential— 
if only that firmness had been constant. The colonial charters were 
written in London. The King's aides passed out charters to Virginiaj 
New York and Connecticut granting them lands extending to the South 
Sea. As a consequence, a number of the colonies had elaborate claims 
to western lands. Efforts were then made by the Continental Congress 
to have the states cede their claims to the territories outside their 
boundaries. The small states insisted that these claims were invalid 
and should be turned over to the federal government. The large states 
insisted that the claims be recognized. The battle between them proved 
hot and heavy. In 1781 Virginia, New York and Connecticut agreed to 
cede their claims to the federal government upon certain conditions. 
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But, as Virginia delegates reported to Governor Thomas Nelson, Congress 
declared "the inadmissability of those cessions upon the conditions 
specified." Congress then fixed a day "for ascertaining the boundaries, 
beyond which Congress would not guarantee, and concluded with the recom­
mendation to lay out separate states in the ceded lands." There then 
came a motion for recommitment of the question, the advocates acting 
upon two different motives, "some intending to open the door for a full 
and minute questioning of the territorial rights of those three states, 
others proposed that the subject should be handled merely upon the 
basis of several resolutions of congress, passed with the express view 
1 
of stifling inquiries of right." 
Matters stood at an impasse until Alexander Hamilton and Philip 
Schuyler of New York concluded that if Virginia, Connecticut and New 
York all claimed the western territory it was unlikely that New York 
nor Connecticut could claim their title. Therefore, New York publicly 
made the gesture of ceding her lands to the federal government with the 
proviso that the others do the same. Connecticut then ceded her terri­
torial claims, which placed intense pressure on Virginia, By the end 
of 1782 Virginia had acquiesced. The importance of such a victory for 
the federal government cannot be doubted. All western lands came under 
the jurisdiction of the national government, which would have command 
of setting up territorial boundaries and, eventually, new states. Also, 
the federal government made use of these western lands by paying the 
Continental soldiers in land scrips. Congress may have had only worth­
less paper money, but it also had something of far more value, and of 
^Hutchinson and Rachel, Papers of Madison, III, 287. 
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more lasting duration.. 
The Articles of Confederation was also the first to deal with 
the problems of taxation and representation. Innien the committee of 
Congress, appointed to draw up the Articles of Confederation, reported 
its opinion that financial requisitions should be drawn on the states 
in proportion to the number of inhabitants, it also recommended that 
each state should be allowed one vote for deciding all questions in 
Congresso "The view that the assessments of the states for requisi­
tions to the Congress should be based on population was supported by 
the feeling that, on the whole, under the conditions prevailing in 
America^ population was a fairly reliable guide to property,," However, 
this recommendation was not accepted by the delegates» It was decided 
instead to assess each state according to the value of its land. The 
mile that each state was to have one vote was maintained on the insist-
ance of the smaller states, "who were in a position of being able to 
exercise a kind of veto." As a result, "The Articles incorporated the 
principle of state sovereignty^, which necessarily meant state equality 
2 
in the Congress," 
By the time the Federal Convention convened, state sovereignty 
had become all-powerful and able to block much national legislation,, 
Madison, between the Confederation and the Federal Convention^ was 
working on a theory that would cut down the importance of state sover­
eignty,, He tried to evolve a system that would both "support" a due 
supremacy of the national authority, and leave in force the local 
authorities so far as "they can be subordinately useful." Madison's 
R, Pole, "The Emergence of the Majority Principle," in Pole 
(ed.). The Ad - ince of Democracy (New York; Harper and Row, 1967), p. 86. 
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plan entailed the idea of individuals, instead of states, who would be 
represented on a numerical basis "in a single, national legislature, 
whose composition would not be affected by state boundaries." The 
Virginia Plan, when originally presented, distinguished between persons 
and property—the two separate sources of representation. "This well 
established doctrine of American Whiggery embodied a pale reflection of 
the British distinction between Lords ajid Commons, and issued forth in 
the two houses of legislature, between which the Senate would represent 
the interests of property, the House of Representatives those of per­
sons. "3 This plan was supported by the large states, because their 
populations would outnumber the small and southern states, even if pop­
ulation was based nationally. Fearing for their independent existence, 
the small states insisted on a compromise. Instead of being a "house 
of property" the Senate must consist of the "specific, institutional 
representation of the states."^ The House of Representatives, under 
the auspices of the "Great Compromise", adopted the principle of pro­
portional representation. 
The great change that emerged out of the Federal Convention was 
the reduction of state sovereignty to a subordinate position. The Arti­
cles of Confederation had originally operated under the principle of 
dual sovereignty, but this had evolved into a greater emphasis on state 
rather than national sovereignty. The Constitution, it was insisted, 
also utilized the principle of dual sovereignty, but the national sover­
eignty came to overshadow the states'. Nevertheless, the corporate 
"̂ I-bid,, p. 87. 
^Ibid. 
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emphasis of the Confederation was now replaced by personal representa­
tion. 
. . . the voters who were to be consulted under the Federal 
Constitution were to be consulted as persons, -not as owners of 
s.pecified amounts of property. Their state governments might 
and usually did impose property qualifications, but these were 
not the result of anything in the Federal Constitutiono Once 
the Federal government was in operation, its electoral system 
gave a possibly unintentional but nevertheless an unmistakable 
impetus to the idea of political democracy.5 
The broad constructionalists got hold of the Constitution early, as can 
be evidenced by the change in representation. They met failure under 
the Confederation to institute proportional requisitions according to 
the number of inhabitants in the states. Had broad constructionalists 
early taken hold under the Articles of Confederation, would "political 
democracy" have had an earlier start? 
The American Revolution was fought against general government. 
Never being chastised strongly by the Continental Congress, "freedom" 
ran rampant. Restraint is taught only by an old order, or respect for 
the new order. Neither the delegates nor the people were ready for a 
stronger government« The Continental Congress only requested, and did 
not utilize its implied power to enforce. But what use is force if a 
whole people do not consent? To use force then would be to substitute 
one arbitrary government for another. Under the Articles of Confeder­
ation government was inefficient and hopelessly in debt. To this 
accusation the Congress, itself, and not the Articles of Confederation, 
must stand guilty. That the delegates failed to put their own house 
in order was, perhaps, the cause for the general disorder. The 
^Ibid., p. 88. 
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predilection of the delegates for lengthy discourse did not convert hot 
air into steam-driven action. The role of Congress all too often took 
on the tone of henpecked husband rather than master of a household. All 
forms of government must have a beginning and a basis on which to judge 
succeeding governments. Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress 
made exploratory incisions into the problems of proportional representa­
tion, western lands and taxation. This, at least, is assured? without 
the Articles of Confederation the Federal Convention would have been 
like the sinking ship of Mark Twain's story, without any cargo to throw 
overboard. 
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